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MANDATORY PRO BONO IN CIVIL CASES: A PARTIAL
ANSWER TO THE RIGHT QUESTION
MICHAEL MILLEMANN*
INTRODUCTION
Our democratic society is distinguished, we claim, by the pri-
macy of law. It is a measure of our national commitment to not just
law, but equality under law, that so many of our laws protect the
poor. However, it is not the "rule of law" idea that is distinctive, but
rather the realization of that idea.
We seek to realize the "rule of law" idea through an adversary
process that is administered by public judges, but operated primar-
ily by private lawyers. By and large, however, private lawyers do not
represent the poor. We apportion public lawyers, and thus ration
justice, to the poor, by triage; only the critically legally wounded can
obtain legal help.
The obvious question posed by this national problem is: How
can we better assure that the poor are protected by law in fact, as
well as in theory. Part of the answer must be that government,
which exists to make laws, should provide independent advocates to
the poor in civil matters to enforce the laws that it makes.
That is not the whole of the answer, however. Private lawyers
exercise government's sovereignty when they are given a monopoly
to operate the adversarial system that implements law. The dele-
gated sovereignty that these "private" lawyers exercise includes the
obligation to implement the law equally and, therefore, the duty to
provide the legal help to the poor that is the predicate of equality.
The case for a mandatory pro bono rule includes policy, consti-
* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., Dartmouth
College, 1966; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1969. I would like to acknowl-
edge several people who provided indispensable assistance and good counsel to me in
the preparation of this article. Generally, I am deeply indebted to the members of the
Maryland Law Review for their good research and editorial suggestions. I especially ap-
preciate the extraordinary editorial work ofJohn Poulton, as well as his seemingly un-
limited patience. Richard Gordon and Joseph Tetrault also provided important help to
me, for which I am very grateful. For me, pro bono is not just a good idea; it is the root
value of the legal profession that, when given life in practice, makes the practice of law a
true profession. There are many good lawyers in Maryland who give life to the pro bono
value on a daily basis. I dedicate this article to them for their good works.
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tutional, philosophical, and historical arguments. Like any long
story, the place to start is at the beginning.
I. MANDATORY PRO BONO: Two CASE EXAMPLES
A. Medieval Scotland. The Pro Bono Tradition
It was the sixteenth century in medieval Scotland and the feudal
tenants of the Abbey of Arbroath were caught in the middle of a
fierce legal feud involving both the Church and a powerful noble
family. The plaintiff' in the civil law action that generated the ten-
ants' legal troubles was the Abbot.' The "defender" was his uncle,
the area Archbishop, one of the richest men in Scotland.3 At issue
were the duties paid annually by the Abbey's tenants.4 The Abbot
claimed them pursuant to the King's common law, asserting rights
under a civilly enforceable contract. 5 The Archbishop invoked a Pa-
pal Bull6 to support his claim to the duties, and he demanded pay-
ment from the tenants as well as the Abbot.'
The tenants' dilemma, aggravated by poverty and servitude,
was that they already had paid the whole of their annual duties, in
the form of a tithed percentage of crops,8 to the Abbot's storehouse
keeper9 who was responsible for supplying the monks' victuals. 10
The tenants argued, having once made the payment, they could not
afford, and should not have to make, double payment to the Arch-
bishop, even if the Abbot had breached his duty to the Arch-
bishop.'' Accordingly, the tenants filed a companion action against
both the Abbot and Archbishop, seeking an order declaring that
their legal duties had been satisfied fully.12
The tenants were represented in the companion cases by a
1. The "Pursuer." 7 THE ScorrIsH NATIONAL DICTIONARY 287 (1968).
2. Arbroath v. Saint Andrews (1532-33), reprinted in SELECTED CASES FROM ACTA
DOMINORUM CONCILII ET SESSIONIS 25-32 (1951) [hereinafter ACTA DOMINORUM].
3. Id., reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 30.
4. Id., reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 25. The "fruits" of the Abbey.
5. Id.
6. Id., reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 26.
7. Id., reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 25-26.
8. Id., reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 31. "Maill teinds." 4 A DIC-
TIONARY OF THE OLDER ScOTrISH TONGUE 15 (1937) [hereinafter SCOTTISH TONGUE DIC-
TIONARY] (original Scottish text).
9. Arbroath, reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 31.
10. Id. Since the rents were paid to the storehouse keeper, it is apparent that, in
general, the rents were paid in kind, not in money.
11. Id., reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 28.
12. Id.
1990]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
procurator,13 a "professional advocate." They needed one. The
trial tactics of the day were rough. After the tenants filed their ac-
tion, the Archbishop responded by having the tenants excommuni-
cated1 4 by a church court, to disqualify them from being heard in
civil court.1 5 The tenants' procurator answered by obtaining a civil
court decree that "absolved" his clients and reinstated their legal
status. 16
During 1532 and 1533, the tenants' procurator produced and
obtained notarized records, 1 7 contractual documents 8 between the
Abbot and Archbishop, and sworn statements that their claims were
supported by just cause.1 9 By these parents of our contemporary
discovery devices, the tenants' procurator prepared the cases for
trial.
The cases moved from civil court to church court to the Scottish
House of Lords, sitting as Lords of Session, 20 as the procurators for
the parties maneuvered for the different substantive and procedural
advantages provided by the courts of church and state.21 In the end,
the Lords ordered the tenants to make the additional payment to
the Archbishop. 2
Today, that unhappy result is far less important than an ex-
traordinary aspect of the procedure that governed the resolution of
the cases. The tenants' procurator had been provided to them with-
13. "One who has been authoritatively accredited to represent others in litigation."
6 ScoTrISH TONGUE DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 268.
14. Arbroath, reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 31. "Cursed" (original
Scottish text).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id., reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 26. "Instruments." 3 SCOTTISH
TONGUE DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 288-89 (original Scottish text).
18. Arbroath, reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 31. "Letters." 3 SCOT-
TISH TONGUE DICTIONARY, supra note 8, at 706-07 (original Scottish text).
19. Arbroath, reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 31. "Oaths de calumnia"
and "juramento" (original Scottish text).
20. Id. Although until 1357 there is little direct evidence, it is believed widely that
during the 13th and 14th centuries, many legal disputes ultimately were resolved by the
King and his Council, a committee composed of the King's agents and members of the
Scottish Parliament. "Parliament was the place in which the king and council heard the
complaints and remedied the grievances of lieges... " Duncan, The Central Courts Before
1532, in AN INTRODUCTION TO SCOTTISH LEGAL HISTORY 321, 324 (1958). By the late
14th century, the Council "had become the hub of the administration, and not least, of
the administration of justice." Id. at 326. The Council could examine evidence, hear
complaints, and issue a decree. Id. at 328.
21. Arbroath, reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 25-30.
22. Id., reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 30.
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out cost 23 So that they effectively could assert their rights in court.
They, and many other clients of the Scottish advocatus pauperum,24
were recipients of an embryonic form of pro bono25 legal aid that
was mandated by a medieval Scottish statute.26 The pro bono work
of the tenants' procurator was performed in an accepted egalitarian
tradition, then already more than a century old in Scotland.2 7
The fifteenth century Scottish statute provided that the King
shall "ordain ' 2 judges to appoint advocates, "persons knowledge-
able in law," 29 to represent the poor in civil cases. 30 This legal aid
23. C. STODDART, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF LEGAL AID IN SCOTLAND 2 n.7 (1979).
24. Other representative clients of the advocatus pauperum who were contemporaries
of the Arbroath tenants included "poor tenants of the lands of Grenok" whose goods
had been "spuilzied" (stolen), Donaldsone v. McFarlane (1532-33), reprinted in ACTA
DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 83-84; a "poor tenant of the lands of Campsfield" whose
oxen was spuilzied, Matheson v. Logane (1533), reprinted in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note
2, at 90-92; and "poor tenants in the lands of Haystoun" whom a "cautioner" (surety)
wrongly refused to reimburse for stolen goods. Thomsoun v. Donochty (1532-33), re-
printed in ACTA DOMINORUM, supra note 2, at 100-01.
25. When the words "pro bono attorneys" are used in this article, I intend them to
mean private attorneys who provide legal help to indigent clients without charge. I dis-
tinguish them in this article from "legal services attorneys," who are publicly funded
attorneys who represent the poor, usually on a full-time basis.
26. Scot. Parl. Acts of 1424, ch. 45 [hereinafter Act of 1424]. The other Provisions
of the Act of 1424 read:
Bills of complaints which may not be determined by the Parliament for
diverse causes belonging of the common profit of the realm, it is ordained that
the bills of complaints be executed and determined by the judges and officers
of the courts to which they pertain of law either Justice, Chamberlein, Sheriffs,
Bailees of Burghs, Barons, or Spiritual Judges. If it pertains to them, to the
which judges all and sundry the King shall give straight commandment as well
within regalities as outwith under all tain and charge that after may follow.
That as well to poor as to rich without flaw or favor they do full law and justice.
And if the judge refuses to do the law evenly, as is before said, the party com-
plaining shall have recourse to the King, who shall see rigorously punished
such judges that it be example to all others.
Id.
27. For a discussion of the history of this egalitarian reform, see infra note 30.
28. It is not entirely clear whether the word "ordain" meant "to authorize" or "to
require," but the better construction of "ordain" is "to require" given the general pro-
tective purpose of the Act of 1424, the language of mandate throughout the Act, and the
accepted meaning of the word in that context. Conversation with Michael Christie, Scot-
tish legal historian and member of the Law Faculty at the University of Aberdeen, Aber-
deen, Scotland (July 1988).
29. C. STODDART, supra note 23, at 1. In 15th century Scotland, "Judges" and "Ad-
vocates" were not yet members of an organized profession. "Advocates," for example,
merely referred to a person who was knowledgeable in law. Id.
30. Act of 1424, supra note 26. Stoddart speculates that the French, not KingJames I
of Scotland, deserve credit for this egalitarian reform.
Like many aspects of Scots law, legal aid was made the subject of legisla-
tion in the fifteenth century. But while it is popularly thought that the credit for
this belongs to James I, it may well be that the origins of the system are to be
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mandate was delivered by Parliament ostensibly to the King, but at
King James' request, it was redirected to the judiciary and private
bar."1 KingJames I had an enlightened "preoccupation with the im-
partial ministering of justice."32 The appointment of advocates for
those "pure [poor] creatures" who lacked "cunning" and "ex-
penses"" helped discharge the "duty of a king to give special hear-
ing and protection to the weak."34
The Scottish Parliament of 1424 spoke on behalf of the poor in
the strongest terms:
If there be any poor person, for want of sophistication
or expenses, that cannot or may not follow his cause, the
King for the love of God shall order the judge, before
whom the cause shall be determined, to obtain and get a
loyal and a wise advocate, to follow such poor person's
causes; and if such causes are successful, the wrongdoer
found in France, not in Scotland. The French Parliament had made provision
for counsel for the poor in 1400 and 1414; it may therefore be no coincidence,
in view of the changes in Scotland due to the Auld Alliance, that legislation
followed with the accession of James I in 1424.
C. STODDART, supra note 23, at 1.
Other commentators on the laws of Scotland referred to the "[p]rovision of counsel
for the poor" as "an old practice" that "was regulated anew by the French Parliament in
1400 and 1414, and was instituted by the Scottish Parliament in 1424-25." G. NEILSON
& H. PATON, ACTA DoMINORUM CONCILU ("Acts of the Lords of Council in Civil Cases")
lxiii (1918). Neilson's and Paton's authority is Stilus Parlamenti cap. I, p.2, 2 AUBERT,
PARLIAMENT DE PARIS 1314-1422 xxxviii.
It, however, appears likely that Scotland's legal aid system is derived from the legal
tradition of Rome and France. See infra text accompanying notes 91-104. The conver-
sion of Scotland to Christianity in the 5th century brought ecclesiastical law and practice
to Scotland. The provision of legal aid to the poor was an important ecclesiastical tradi-
tion that, by 1424, was almost 1000 years old. C. STODDART, supra note 23, at 1.
31. The Act was an attempt by the King and Parliament, before there was a central-
ized court or organized bar, to nationalize the judiciary and extend the rule of law
throughout the realm. C. STODDART, supra note 23, at 1. The first provision of the Act,
see supra note 26, sought to delegate to local courts more of the judicial workload of
Parliament, sitting as the King's Council. Id. The specific legal aid mandate, and the
more general directive to "do full law and justice" to the "poor as to rich," were appar-
ent conditions of the delegated judicial responsibility. Id.
32. Duncan, supra note 20, at 330.
33. Act of 1424, supra note 26.
34. Duncan, supra note 20, at 330. "The dispensation of justice was the duty of a
medieval king and was all the more necessary in a country where the local courts, royal
and private, were as yet in early stages of development." Id. at 321. Indeed, an Act of
the Scottish Parliament in the 12th century (during the reign of David 1) provided that
"[a]ll destitute of help from all others are in the care and protection of the King." Max-
well, Civil Procedure, in AN INTRODUCTION TO SCOTrISH LEGAL HISTORY 413 (1958). Early
Scottish kings, especially David, "personally handled much legal business; and David
acted as a judge of first instance in the minor and summary complaints of poor people,
sitting at his palace gate, or on circuit, and prescribed procedure in such causes." Id.
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shall compensate both the party wronged, and the advo-
cate's costs and travel.35
The Parliament also warned local judges that, if they refused "to do
the law evenly, as is before said, the party complaining shall have
recourse to the King, who shall see rigorously punished such judges
that it be example to all others." 6 The courts that were required to
appoint advocates for the poor included virtually all the local courts
of the day: "Justice, Chamberlein, Sheriffs, Baillies of Burghs, Bar-
ons, and Spiritual Judges. 3 7
The Act of 1424, which predated a centralized court system and
organized bar,3" did not by itself create a comprehensive legal aid
program. A century later, in response to a request by King James V
in 1535, in whichJames expressed deep concern about the legal dif-
ficulties that the poor encountered, ° the developing bar selected
two members, apparently on a rotating basis, to be advocati
pauperum.4' This title carried with it an honorarium of ten pounds
annually and a reminder that the advocatus could be "deprived of his
right to plead before the court if he failed to discharge his duty."4
Until 1949, when Parliament enacted the comprehensive Legal
Aid and Advice Act,4 2 this basic structure, grounded in the 1424
Act, was the core of the Scottish civil legal aid system:
It is in these provisions that the rudiments of what
came to be known as the Poor's Roll are found: the appli-
cant's legal representative was appointed for him by the
35. In its original form, the statute read:
.. gif there bee onie pure creature, for faulte of cunning or expenses, that can-
not, nor may not follow his cause, the King for the love of GOD, sail ordain the
judge, before quhom the cause suld be determined, to purvey and get a leill
and a wise Advocate, to follow sik pure creatures causes; And gif sik causes be
obtained, the wranger sal assyith baith the partie skaithed, and the Advocatis
coastes and travel ....
C. STODDART, supra note 23, at 1.
36. See supra note 26.
37. Id.
38. C. STODDART, supra note 23, at 1.
39. See id. at 2. In its original form, King James V recited that "we are daily infestit
be the complant of divers our pur [poor] legis perserverand for justice, quhilkis an
postponit tharfra in default of advocatis to procur for thame." Id. King James V re-
quested that "ane man of gud conscience ...be chosin be you quhilk sail be callit
advocatus pauperum, quhem ye sail cause sweir that he sail administer to all our liegis
cumand to him for help that will mak faith thai have nocht to persew justice with all of
that awn." Id.
40. KingJames II enacted this into law by the Act of Sederunt on April 27, 1535, cited
in C. STODDART, supra note 23, at 2.
41. Id.
42. 12 & 13 Geo. 6, ch. 51 (1949).
1990]
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profession, but the court itself had to be satisfied of the
appellant's poverty before admitting him. In a sense, all
that occurred in the history of the Poor's Roll in civil cases
thereafter was simply refinement and adaptation of these
fundamental rules.43
B. Maryland's Modern Day Rent Court.' The Need
for a Pro Bono Ethic Today
Let us travel across an ocean and over 450 years into today's
Baltimore City Rent Court.44 We find a place to sit in the crowded
courtroom, and observe several hundred tenants waiting silently for
their cases to be called; over one thousand have had trials set for
this day,45 but the vast majority never appear.46 Most who have ap-
43. C. STODDART, supra note 23, at 3. By 1784, amendments to the 1424 Act speci-
fied that "six advocates for the poor should be appointed annually... and that both the
Writers to the Signet [Scottish solicitors] and agents should each nominate four of their
number to be writers and agents for the poor." Id. at 6 (citation omitted). The 1784
legislation also responded to criticism that too many litigants were being admitted to the
Poor's Roll, and thus made eligible for legal aid, by vesting the "minister and two elders
of the parish in which [the applicant] resided" with the initial responsibility for deter-
mining the applicant's financial eligibility; requiring that notice of, and an opportunity
to object to a petition for admission to the Poor's Roll be given to the applicant's adver-
sary; and formalizing the procedure for determining the probabilis causa litigandi that was
a second requirement of eligibility. Id. at 6-7.
44. A specialized court of the Maryland District Court for Baltimore City, Civil Divi-
sion [hereinafter Rent Court].
45. In 1987-88, there were 672,384 civil cases filed in the District Courts of Mary-
land. 1987 ANN. REP. THE MD. JUDICIARY 75. "Landlord/Tenant filings accounted for
72.7 percent (488,531) of all civil filings reported for fiscal 1988." Id. During fiscal year
1988, there were 195,711 landlord-tenant filings reported in Baltimore City. Id. Most
were "summary ejectment proceedings" filed by landlords. When a tenant fails to pay
her rent, the Maryland Code authorizes a landlord to
make [a] written complaint ... before the District Court ... wherein the prop-
erty is situated ... praying by warrant to repossess the premises, together with
judgment for the amount of rent due and costs. The District Court shall issue
its summons ... ordering [a sheriff or constable] to notify ... the tenant ... to
appear ... at the trial to be held on thefifth day after the filing of the complaint,
to answer the landlord's complaint .. .then the constable or sheriff shall affix
an attested copy of the summons conspicuously upon the property....
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-401(b) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). According to
the Honorable Joseph P. McCurdy, Jr., the judge assigned to Rent Court when this arti-
cle was published, the daily Rent Court docket ranges from "300 to 3,000" cases. Inter-
view with the Hon.Joseph P. McCurdy, Jr. (Oct. 3, 1989) (copy on file with Maryland Law
Review). A "Civil Statistical Report" issued monthly for the District Court of Maryland
for Baltimore City reports that forJuly and August of 1988, 16,054 and 15,667 summary
ejectment complaints were filed, respectively. See DISTRICT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR
BALTIMORE CITY, CIVIL STATISTICAL REPORTS (July/Aug. 1988) [hereinafter CIVIL STATIS-
TICAL REPORT]. The Rent Court's docket grows to its largest numbers during the middle
weeks of the month because it takes this period of time for landlords to realize rent is
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peared are responding to summary ejectment complaints alleging
that they have failed to pay their rents.
The "white slip" line forms before the docket is called, and it
snakes along three of the four courtroom walls to the clerk's desk,
next to where the judge sits when court is convened. These tenants
are accepting put-out orders ("white slips") because it is the only
way they can obtain emergency Aid for Dependent Children (AFDC)
grants to pay their rent. They rarely are represented by counsel
who could tell them that they may have good defenses to eviction or
that such orders may disqualify them in the future from asserting a
number of claims and defenses.4 7 When the court session begins,
we watch the tenants nervously approach the bench as their cases
overdue, file summary ejectment proceedings, and have cases scheduled for trial. See
interview with the Hon. Joseph P. McCurdy, Jr., supra.
46. For example, during July 1988, 1,373 of 16,059 defendants in summary eject-
ment proceedings appeared for trial. CIVIL STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 45.
47. The Hon. Joseph P. McCurdy, Jr., the current Rent Court Judge estimates that
approximately 5% of the tenants who appear for trial are represented by counsel, about
one-half by attorneys from the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., and about one-half by "student
attorneys," law students practicing pursuant to Rule 18 of the Maryland Rules Gov-
erning Admission to the Bar, 2 MD. R. 18 (1989). Interview with the Hon. Joseph P.
McCurdy, Jr., supra note 45; see CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAWS OF BALTIMORE CITY § 9-
9(d)(3) (1979 & Supp. 1988). After these tenants have accepted "white slips," the Rent
Court Judge, in his "opening statement," advises tenants who are in the courtroom that:
If you are a tenant and you believe that your home is in need of substantial
repairs, you are directed to send your landlord a certified letter return receipt
requested listing the repairs that are needed in order to give the landlord no-
tice of these conditions. The landlord will have a reasonable period of time
after receiving the letter in which to complete the repairs. This usually means
thirty (30) days. If the landlord fails to do so, then you have the option of
withholding the following month[']s rent, and when the landlord files a rent
notice against you, of coming to court, and bringing with you your copy of the
certified letter, the green card from the post office which indicates the date that
the landlord received the letter, and any other relevant evidence such as photo-
graphs. I will instruct you further if this becomes an issue in your case.
Baltimore City Rent Court Opening Statement (provided by the Hon. Joseph P. Mc-
Curdy, Jr.) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
In the summons served on a tenant, the only mention of possible defenses to the
landlord's complaint is on the back side of the summons in the section designated: "To
The Tenant." Summons of the District Court of Maryland, Failure to Pay Rent-Land-
lord's Complaint for Repossession of Rented Property (copy on file with Maryland Law
Review). In item 4, the summons states that "If you have a defense or think you do not
owe the rent, you should come to court and state the facts. You have a right to bring a
lawyer to the court with you." Id. The vast majority of tenants have no knowledge of
the landlord's duty to guarantee the tenants quiet enjoyment of the premises, Sigmend
v. Howard Bank, 29 Md. 324 (1868); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (1988), the
landlord's duty to remove lead-based paint, id. § 8-211.1, the landlord's duty to main-
tain a record of rent paid, id. § 8-208.2, or the landlord's duties to comply with the rent
escrow and implied warranty of habitability laws. See infra note 48.
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are called and make brief ineffective and nonresponsive arguments.
The Rent Court Judges are selected, in part, because they have the
patience and willingness to assist pro se litigants. In my experience,
they usually protect the rights of pro se litigants as well as any "mass
justice" court does, or can. However, given the extraordinary Rent
Court docket and the limits of the judicial role, the judge is not a
substitute for an advocate.
We witness an extraordinary paradoxical ritual. Many of the
tenants have valid rent escrow, breach of the warranty of habitabil-
ity, and other claims and defenses."' Yet very few assert them.
Many tenants face eviction, and possibly homelessness, without lay-
ing claim to these basic protections primarily because they do not
know about them.4" The laws that in theory protect the tenants in
Rent Court are inaccessible to them in fact. An injustice is
occurring.
We repeat this fundamental institutional hypocrisy on a daily
basis. The pro se litigants are disabled workers who seek disability
48. There are two rent escrow laws. CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAws OF BALTIMORE
CITY § 9-9 (1979 & Supp. 1988) authorizes the Rent Court to establish an escrow fund
and require tenants to pay either their full rent, or an abated amount of rent, into that
escrow account if there are conditions within the leased premises that "constitute a fire
hazard or serious threat to the life, health, or safety of occupants thereof .... ." Id.
§ 9.9(b). Such conditions can include, but are not limited to, "a lack of heat or of hot or
cold running water," a lack of "light" or "electricity," a lack of "adequate sewage dispo-
sal facilities," "an infestation of rodents (except if the property is a one-family dwell-
ing)," or "the existence of paint containing lead pigment on surfaces within the
dwelling, provided that the landlord has notice of the painted surfaces, and if such con-
dition would be in violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code." Id. There is a similar
statewide law. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (1988).
CODE OF PUBLIC LOCAL LAws OF BALTIMORE CITY § 9-14.1 (1979 & Supp. 1988),
includes an "implied warranty of fitness for human habitation" in every written or oral
lease for rental of a dwelling intended for human habitation. Id. The warranty of fitness
"for human habitation" means that the leased premises "shall not have any conditions
which endanger the life, health, and safety of the tenants, including, but not limited to
vermin or rodent infestation, lack of sanitation, lack of heat, lack of running water, or
lack of electricity." Id. § 9-14.1 (b)(3). Breach of the rent escrow statutes and the war-
ranty of habitability statute may be asserted as affirmative claims or defenses to a sum-
mary ejectment proceeding. Damages are "computed retroactively to the date of the
landlord's actual knowledge of the breach of warranty and shall be the amount of rent
paid or owed to the landlord during the time of the breach less the reasonable rental
value of the dwelling in its deteriorated condition." Id. § 9-14.2(d).
49. During August 1988, for example, there were only 226 rent escrow accounts es-
tablished in 15,667 summary ejectment cases. See CIVIL STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note
45. The extensive landlord-tenant experience of the University of Maryland's Clinical
Law and Cardin Programs indicates that a far larger number-probably a majority-of
"inner city" defendants in summary ejectment proceedings have meritorious rent es-
crow or warranty of habitability defenses that would warrant the establishment of escrow
accounts.
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benefits that, if granted, will be the only income for them and their
families; elderly persons who assert legal claims to Medicaid pay-
ments that would pay for essential health care; disabled children
who seek a special education to which they claim they are entitled;
women and children who ask for legal protections from life-threat-
ening abuse; institutionalized persons-juveniles, the mentally ill,
the mentally retarded, presumptively innocent pretrial inmates, and
convicted persons-who assert rights to minimal living conditions
or habilitative care and treatment; migrant workers and immigrants
who claim the right to work and/or live in this country; and other
indigent claimants. Like the tenants in Rent Court, these poor per-
sons are not special pleaders who beg for gratuities; instead, they
assert rights that are the predicates of life, personal health and safety.
The rights they claim, however, are buried in the complex language
of lawyers.
Only one in five of these indigent litigants will be able to obtain
the legal help that is essential to enforce their rights;50 the vast ma-
jority will be represented by lawyers who work for government-
funded legal services programs. 51 Most often, the rights of the re-
maining indigent litigants simply will not be enforced, despite ro-
mantic notions of pro se capacity and judicial paternalism. These
millions of American citizens, hundreds of thousands in Maryland,52
live in a form of domestic exile from the law. For the last decade,
the executive branch of the United States Government has sought to
increase this number by attempting to abolish the national Legal
Services Corporation, the primary source of funding for programs
that provide legal help to the poor.5" There is no evidence that the
current national administration will alter this exclusionary policy
significantly.54
There is an obvious source of legal help that, to date, has not
been tapped: the private bar. In Maryland, volunteerism has gener-
ated relatively little legal help for the poor.55 Although private at-
torneys may now have a legally enforceable duty to represent the
poor, the Maryland Court of Appeals should make it explicit in a
comprehensive mandatory pro bono rule. The possible sources of
50. See MARYLAND LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION ADVISORY COUNCIL, ACTION PLAN
FOR LEGAL SERVICES TO MARYLAND'S POOR vi (1988) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN].
51. See id. at 12-17.
52. See id. at 6-8.
53. Edsall, Consensus Builds to Expand Aid for Working Poor, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1989,
at Al, col. 1.
54. Id.
55. See infra note 199.
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an existing pro bono duty, and the justifications for making it ex-
plicit in a rule, are the subject of this article.
II. POSSIBLE SOURCES OF AN EXISTING PRO BONO DUTY
There are suggestions of a pro bono duty in history,56 state dec-
larations of rights,57 the ethical codes of lawyers,58 and the inherent
powers of courts. 59 However, the most important pro bono battle
to reach the United States Supreme Court recently was fought over
the meaning of one word in a federal statute.
A. A Rejected Source: Title 28, Section 1915(d) of
the United States Code
In Mallard v. The United States District Court For The Southern Dis-
trict of Iowa,6 ° the Supreme Court held that title 28, section 1915(d)
of the United States Code,6' which provides that federal courts may
"request" attorneys to represent civil litigants in in forma pauperis
cases, does not authorize federal courts to require attorneys to do pro
bono work.6 2 The Court, however, refused to decide whether fed-
eral courts have "inherent authority" to compel attorneys to repre-
sent the poor in civil cases.63
56. See infra text accompanying notes 91-136.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 137-139.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 163, 173-179.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85.
60. 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982) provides that: "The court may request an attorney
to represent any such person [i.e., an indigent] unable to employ counsel and may dis-
miss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivo-
lous or malicious."
62. 109 S. Ct. at 1823.
63. Id. at 1822-23. The case is puzzling in several respects. The opinion was written
by Justice Brennan; Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined in the opinion. Id. at 1816. This was the only 5-4 decision during the 1988-89
Term of the Court in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Brennan were on the
same side. See Nat'l LJ., Aug. 21, 1989, at supp. 3. "The court split 5-4 in a total of 32
cases. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. were on
opposite sides in 31 of the 32 cases." Id. Moreover, there was a plainly narrower
ground of decision. Justice Brennan might have held that, whether or not § 1915(d)
authorizes federal courts to require attorneys to represent the poor, the mandatory ap-
pointment of Mallard was an abuse of discretion. Mallard was admitted to practice
before the district court in January 1987. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817. He possessed
some expertise in bankruptcy and securities law, not litigation. Id. He was asked to
represent two then-incarcerated inmates and one former inmate in a prisoner rights case
brought pursuant to the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Id. After
reviewing the case file, he filed a motion to withdraw with the United States Magistrate
who was presiding over the case. Id. at 1817. He asserted that he was not familiar with
civil rights actions and, in particular, prisoner rights cases. When the magistrate denied
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Justice Kennedy cast the swing vote in this five to four deci-
sion.64 Although in his concurring opinion he agrees that Congress,
in enacting section 1915(d), did not intend to impose a pro bono
duty upon lawyers, he suggests cryptically that this (perhaps nonen-
forceable) duty inheres in the tradition and nature of the profes-
sion.65 In full, he says:
Our decision today speaks to the interpretation of a statute,
to the requirements of the law, and not to the professional
responsibility of the lawyer. Lawyers, like all those who
practice a profession, have obligations to their calling
which exceed their obligations to the State. Lawyers also
have obligations by virtue of their special status as officers
of the court. Accepting a court's request to represent the
indigent is one of those traditional obligations. Our judg-
ment here does not suggest otherwise. To the contrary, it
is precisely because our duties go beyond what the law de-
mands that ours remains a noble profession. 66
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Mallard provides support
for both those who advocate and those who oppose the mandatory
pro bono concept. In the last paragraph of his opinion, Justice
Brennan
emphasize[s] that our decision today is limited to interpret-
ing Section 1915(d). We do not mean to question, let
alone denigrate, lawyers' ethical obligation to assist those
who are too poor to afford counsel, or to suggest that re-
quests made pursuant to Section 1915(d) may be lightly de-
clined because they give rise to no ethical claim. On the
contrary, in a time when the need for legal services among
the poor is growing and public funding for such services
has not kept pace, lawyers' ethical obligation to volunteer
their time and skills pro bono publico is manifest. Nor do we
express an opinion on the question whether the federal
his motion to withdraw, Mallard argued to the district court that he was "not a litigator
by training or temperament" and not competent to handle the assigned case. Id. The
Iowa Volunteer Lawyers Project, which administered the federal court's mandatory ap-
pointment program, refused to create "an exception to the rule of assignment," even
though there was a substantial pool of otherwise qualified lawyers and Mallard agreed to
do substitute pro bono work. Id. Under these facts, the court certainly would have been
justified in holding that, whether or not § 1915(d) authorizes mandatory appointment of
counsel, the lower court had failed to develop a sensible, efficient, and fair assignment
system.
64. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
65. See id.
66. Id.
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courts possess inherent authority to require lawyers to
serve.... [T]he District Court did not invoke its inherent
power in its opinion below, and the Court of Appeals did
not offer this ground for denying Mallard's application for
writ of mandamus. We therefore leave that issue for an-
other day.
6 7
Justice Brennan rests his majority opinion on the plain meaning of
the "operative term ' 68 of section 1915(d)-"request":
To request that somebody do something is to express a de-
sire that he do it, even though he may not generally be dis-
ciplined or sanctioned if he declines. . . . In everyday
speech, the closest synonyms of the verb "request" are
"ask," "petition," and "entreat." . . . The verbs "require"
and "demand" are not usually interchangeable with it. 69
He points out that the immediate companion of section 1915(d),
section 1915(c), contains the language of command,70 indicating
that "Congress evidently knew how to require service when it
deemed compulsory service appropriate."''- Justice Brennan also
examines the language of section 1915(d), which was enacted in
1892, through an historical lens. He notes that, "[b]y the late 19th
century, at least 12 States had statutes permitting courts to assign
counsel to represent indigent litigants." 7 2  He observes that:
"[n]one of those state statutes, however, provided that a court could
merely request that an attorney serve without compensation. All of
them provided instead that a court could assign or appoint coun-
sel. ' 7' The majority opinion concludes that, by choosing the word
"request," Congress fully intended to adopt a less demanding fed-
eral practice. 4
Justice Brennan, bolsters his opinion by arguing, based on a law
67. Id. at 1822-23.
68. Id. at 1818.
69. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1929 (3d ed. 1981);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (5th ed. 1979)).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1982). It requires court officers to serve process and per-
form all other relevant duties in in forma pauperis cases and similarly requires witnesses
to attend and participate in in forma pauperis cases as they do in all other cases. Id.
71. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818. Later in his opinion, Justice Brennan completes the
statutory analysis by comparing the discretionary language of § 1915(d) with mandatory
appointment of counsel language in a number of other federal statutes. Id. at 1821.
72. Id. at 1818-19 (emphasis added). The twelve states were Arkansas, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vir-
ginia, and West Virginia. Id. at 1818.
73. Id. at 1819 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
74. Id.
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review article,7 5 that there was no " 'firm [mandatory pro bono] tra-
dition in England and the United States .... "76 In this country,
few appointments were made pursuant to the nineteenth century
state statutes authorizing the assignment of counsel to indigents in
civil cases, many legal proceedings were not transcribed, and "law-
yers seem rarely to have balked at courts' assignments." ' 77 There-
fore, it is "unclear" whether the state statutes authorize "courts to
sanction attorneys who refused to serve without compensation
... ,"78 This is "significant," in Justice Brennan's view, for it sug-
gests the absence of a coercive pro bono appointment system that,
in turn, "suggests that Congress did not intend to replicate a system
of coercive appointments when it enacted Section 1915(d)." '79 Jus-
tice Brennan finds the English experience "equally murky." 8 ° He
states:
Few appointments were made in either civil or criminal
cases; and although sergeants-at-law were expected to rep-
resent indigent persons upon demand of the court, they
held public office and were court officers in a much fuller
sense than advocates who appeared before it. Again, no
reported decisions involve the imposition of sanctions on
lawyers unwilling to serve.8 '
Dissenting, Justice Stevens82 identifies an aggregate source of
mandatory pro bono responsibility far broader than the text of sec-
tion 1915(d): "tradition, respect for the profession, the inherent
power of the judiciary, and the commands that are set forth in ca-
nons of ethics, rules of court, and legislative enactments.''83 In the
view of the dissenters, a court is authorized to impose a pro bono
duty upon the bar "to protect the functioning of its own processes"
because that duty "is part of the ancient traditions of the bar long
recognized by this Court and the courts of the several States. '"84
"Section 1915(d) embodies this authority to order counsel to repre-
sent indigent litigants even if it does not exhaust it."8 5
75. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1980).
76. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1819 (citing Shapiro, supra note 75, at 753).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Shapiro, supra note 75, at 740-49).
82. Id. at 1823-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He was joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and O'Connor.
83. Id. at 1823.
84. Id. at 1824.
85. Id. at 1825.
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B. A Possible Source: The Incorporation of A Mandatory Pro Bono Duty
in Maryland's Received Law
In Mallard, Justice Brennan employs accepted axioms of statu-
tory construction to discover legislative intent, although in so doing
he probably understates the mandatory pro bono tradition.86 If Jus-
tice Brennan correctly recreates and interprets history, he does so
for a very limited purpose: to divine the intent of the Congress that
enacted title 28, section 1915(d) of the United States Code in 1892.
The history of mandatory pro bono is relevant in answering two
questions that were not before the Court in Mallard. Did the settlers
of our nation's earliest states, like Maryland, transport a mandatory
pro bono duty from England and incorporate it into state law?
Should the highest state courts or state legislatures explicitly impose
such a duty on the bar today?
History helps us answer these questions. There is good reason
to believe that, through Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights, Maryland's received law now includes an English statute that
authorizes trial judges to appoint counsel to represent the poor in
civil cases.
8 7
The history of mandatory pro bono also helps rebut the most
powerful contemporary objection to the imposition of a mandatory
pro bono rule: that it is the obligation of the government, one that
is not shared by private lawyers, to provide legal services to the
poor. In fact, government and the private bar have shared this fun-
damental obligation for many years. The early pro bono advocates
often were leaders of the state, or were informally "deputized" by
the state to represent the poor for free. These advocates, like to-
day's lawyers, exercised government's delegated law enforcement
sovereignty in return for permission to represent clients and, later,
the monopolistic right to do so. When these historic advocates rep-
resented the poor, they did so because fulfilling that duty legiti-
mized both the developing private profession (by justifying the
concept of representation itself) and the state (by bringing the poor
within the state's rule of law).8 8 These historic sources of pro bono
duty continue to be today's most forceful justifications for a
mandatory pro bono rule.
The important lesson to learn from history is not, as Justice
Brennan's opinion in Mallard sometimes intimates, that the societies
86. See supra text accompanying notes 67-81.
87. See infra text accompanying notes 137-161.
88. See infra text accompanying notes 91-161.
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that fed humans to animals for recreation"9 and hung children for
picking pockets9" did not always faithfully implement the pro bono
value. Rather, the striking features of history are that early, often
brutal societies did endorse this value. If they did not always imple-
ment the pro bono value, they often did, giving it life through the
combined efforts of the state and "private" advocates.
1. The History.--a. Rome.-During the late Republic and early
Roman Empire, the poor's advisor and advocate was the patrician
head of the extended Roman household.9 ' The relationship be-
tween the patrician and his household92 or "clients"-93 created recip-
rocal duties. The household member or client owed his patrician
allegiance. In turn, the patrician provided legal aid to his depen-
dent clients. In particular the patrician, called a patronus in court,
was bound to appear in court for his clients, and to explain the law
to them, since knowledge of the old customary law of the city was a
monopoly of the heads of patrician households.94
89. At the same time that a variant of the pro bono ethos flourished in Rome, see infra
text accompanying notes 91-104, the regular spectacles at the Colosseum that were part
of government's "bread and circus" strategy included feeding Christians, among others,
to lions. SeeJ. CARCOPINO, DAILY LIFE IN ANCIENT ROME 243-44 (1940).
90. By 1495, England had enacted a law that authorized a variety of courts to appoint
private lawyers to represent the poor without fee. See infra text accompanying notes 105-
107. At the same time, the penalty for many crimes, including pickpocketing, was death,
even when the offenders were young children. See Bedau, General Introduction, in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 24 (J. McCafferty ed. 1972).
91. 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 704 (1959). During the early Republican Period
(509-27 B.C.), Roman society was organized around gentes (clans) that were composed of
relatedfamiliae (families). The paterfamilias governed the family unit with virtually unlim-.
ited patriae potestas (sovereignty of the home) that marked early Roman law. Collectively,
the heads of thefamiliae were the early Republic's governing patricians whose descend-
ants sat in the Senatus or Upper House of the popular assembly. SeeJ. CARCOPINO, supra
note 89, at 53. Roscoe Pound paints a warm paternal picture of the learned patrician
who "knew the customary law" and "sat in the courtyard of his house and advised his
dependents." 5 R. POUND, supra, at 704.
92. See 5 R. POUND, supra note 91, at 704; R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY
To MODERN TIMES 44-45 (1953) [hereinafter THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY To MODERN
TIMES]. The "household" included many members who were not related by blood or
marriage to the patron, including those who "attached themselves to some households
as dependents" and slaves manumitted by the patron. Id. at 45.
93. THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY To MODERN TIMES, supra note 92, at 44. There
was a version of this relationship in Greece. Pound, describing the history of represen-
tation in ancient Greece, identified the "kin group" as the earliest legal unit and, there-
fore, the "head of the kin group" as the earliest representative. "The kin group speaks
through its head on behalf of dependents because their cause is its cause. The kinless
man, the emancipated man, the man who is not a dependent, speaks for himself." Id. at
31.
94. Id. at 44-45. Thus this duty of the patron toward his client was the basis both of
the advocate's function and of thejurisconsult's [advisor's] function as they developed at
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The patroni were eminent private citizens who also were govern-
mental leaders. 95 As word of a patron's oratory skills spread, the
number of his legal "clients" grew, including many who were not
part of his household.9 6 The result was a new profession of trial
Rome. Id. at 45. See Cappelletti and Gordley for a summary of the legal aid role of the
patronus in Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations: Part One: The Emergence of a Modern
Theme, 24 STAN. L. REV. 347, 348-51 (-1972). "[T]he weak and impoverished attached
themselves to [this] powerful man," who "assisted them in many of their difficulties,
including litigation" and, most probably, also provided the "extralegal help necessary to
prosecute a case against a powerful opponent in a Roman court." Id. at 349 (footnotes
omitted). In return, the indigent client provided "certain services and political support"
to the patron. Id.
95. The patronus' household was an important component of the governance struc-
ture. Unlike the Republic, the Empire was a plutocratic aristocracy. There were not
sharp distinctions between public and private spheres. Instead, with limited exceptions,
one's private status, defined in terms of class and wealth, determined whether or not he
governed. J. CARCOPINO, supra note 89, at 52.
The rigid hierarchy of classes was complex. Free-born were distinct from slaves. Id.
But free-born included citizens and noncitizens. Id. Citizens, in turn, included honesti-
ores-for example, senators, knights, soldiers, veterans, municipal office-holders, and
their descendants-and humiliores, the remainder of the citizenry. Id. Honestiores also
were differentiated by titles: "distinguished man," "very perfect man," "most eminent
man," and "most famous man". Id. at 53.
This elaborate class structure apportioned public rights and duties through a chain
of interdependence:
From the parasite do-nothing up to the great aristocrat there was no man in
Rome who did not feel himself bound to someone more powerful above him by
the same obligations of respect, or, to use the technical term, the same obse-
quium, that bound the ex-slave to the master who had manumitted him.
Id. at 171 (footnote omitted).
At the summit of the social scale was the Senatorial Order. A member of
this order had to own at least 1,000,000 sesterces ($40,000). The emperor could
at will appoint him to command his legions, to act as legate or proconsul in the
most important provinces, to administer the chief services of the city, or to hold
the highest posts in the priesthood.
Id. at 53 (footnotes omitted).
While the clients of the patronus were duty-bound to demonstrate their allegiance to,
and dependence upon the patronus, the patronus for his part was honor-bound to protect
them. Id. at 171.
96. THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUrrY To MODERN TIMES, supra note 92, at 45-46. The
assortment of legal skills that a patron had to have to effectively represent his dependent
clients was as varied then as now. Id. at 42. In the initial injure stage of civil litigation,
the praetor or judicial magistrate identified the issues (claims and defenses) to be tried
and fashioned instructions for the jury. The authority for a litigant's claims and de-
fenses was the praetor's "edict," an a priori pronouncement generally indicating how the
praetor would decide hypothetical cases. Id. at 35. "On taking office the praetor an-
nounced in his edict the relief he would be prepared to grant and the defenses he would
allow on application of anyone asserting that the state of facts contemplated had arisen."
Id. at 35. The careful analytical skills of an advocate were necessary to bring claims and
defenses within the language of the edict. A plaintiff "had to go before the judicial
magistrate and point out the particular provision of the edict upon which he relied as the
basis of his action," and "a defendant who desired to assert a defense other than that the
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lawyers, born in the dependency of Roman classes cultivated by the
state, that was one segment of the developing bar. 7
Patrons represented their dependents without fee,9 8 and this
pro bono tradition was difficult to dislodge when patroni represented
clients who lived and worked outside the household. 9 Indeed, one
commentator notes that during the Republic and early Empire "we
find no serious complaints that advocates' fees prevented the small
man from litigating." 0
With the disintegration of the Empire, the law of the Church
became increasingly authoritative in Rome. By the early Middle
Ages, there was a well developed system of ecclesiastical courts, and
the Pope had become "supreme legislator and judge in ecclesiastical
causes as the emperor had been in temporal causes."' Ecclesiasti-
cal jurisdiction was extensive, including many aspects of what today
would be called probate, domestic, and family practice. Litigants
appeared in person or were represented by a "proctor" or
plaintiff's case was not made out" was required to "point out to the judicial magistrate
the particular clause of the edict on which he relied. One not thoroughly versed in the
law would need advice or, better, would need someone to make the application to the
judicial magistrate on his behalf." Id. at 36.
A number ofjudices, or a singlejudex, decided the case during the second injudicio
stage of the civil lawsuit that we would find strikingly familiar today. Id. at 42. In the
Republic, judices often were lay jurors. In the Empire, thejudex initially often was a pri-
vate arbitrator and later often was an official of the Empire. Id. at 42-43. Orators were
the "trial" attorneys. Id. at 43. Testimony was presented by witnesses, without limiting
rules of evidence. See id. at 47-48. "Cross examination was highly developed." Id. at 48.
The quality of oratory during argument and examination often was decisive, and as ora-
tors Romans had few peers. "At the trial there might be speeches with introduction of
evidence in the course of the speech .... or speeches followed by evidence," among
other procedures. Id. at 43. "There was no limit to the number of orators who might
speak, but, though six are known to have spoken on each side in one case, usually there
were not more than four on a side." Id.
97. In addition to the "advocates" or "orators," who were the representatives in
trials or injudicio proceedings, there were procurators, who were "agents" or "repre-
sentatives" in injure proceedings, and "jurisconsults," who were legal advisors. Id. at
55; see also 5 R. POUND, supra note 91, at 696-702.
98. "In the beginning the patron advised his client and supported his client's case or
defended him because these were duties the patron owed to one dependent upon him."
THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY To MODERN TIMES, supra note 92, at 51.
99. 5 R. POUND, supra note 91, at 697-98. Quintilian "laid down that advocacy was a
service gratuitously rendered for its own sake for which the advocate might honorably
accept a fair honorarium, voluntarily bestowed as a gift, but for which no bargain as to
compensation and nothing in the way of hire was permitted." Id. at 698. Pound ob-
served further that, "[i]f anything more than the texts of Roman law had been needed to
establish the tradition the authority of [this] great treatise of antiquity was decisive." Id.
100. J. KELLY, ROMAN LITIGATION 84 & n.1 (1966).
101. THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY To MODERN TIMES, supra note 92, at 63.
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"advocate." 10 2
Clerical advocates became the defensores pauperum, who repre-
sented miserabiles personae, first in ecclesiastical courts and later, with
lay advocates, in Rome's secular courts. 0 3 Their practice was "that
of advocates at law to defend the rights of the poor and the liberties
of the Church against all aggressors and invaders."'0 4
b. England.-The Roman legal aid experience had a significant
impact on the English, and through England, on the early American
experiences. 10 5 The primary Roman influence on the ethos of the
English legal profession was established not by the direct transmis-
sion of the Empire's legal culture through Rome's occupation and
governance of England, but several centuries later through the
Church and its ecclesiastical courts.'0 6 With the conversion of Eng-
land, Rome's legal aid tradition gradually became part of England's
ecclesiastical court practice. Tracing the Roman influence, one
commentator "safely assumes" that "the English bishops before the
Conquest were well aware of the existence of ecclesiastical advo-
cates in [Roman] ecclesiastical courts and almost certainly of lay ad-
vocates in secular courts, at any rate, as representatives of poor
suitors-widows, orphans,furiosi, the mentally ill, etc., and of prop-
ertied persons under age.' 10 7
102. Id. at 66.
103. See H. COHEN, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH BAR 24-29 (1967).
104. Id. at 24. The office of the advocatus pauperium deputatus et stiperdiatus was created
by canon law. The advocatus was paid by the Church to represent the poor in ecclesiasti-
cal courts. Cappelletti & Gordley, supra note 94, at 351. This "institution spread to the
secular courts in several parts of France and to many of the free communes of Italy." Id.
(citations omitted).
105. See generally 5 R. POUND, supra note 91, at 696-7 10.
106. H. COHEN, supra note 103, at 19-22. "In the year 597, missionaries from Rome
arrived in Kent; and the local kings of England began to issue laws, as Bede said, 'in the
Roman style', but in the English language . A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 13 (1966).
107. H. COHEN, supra note 103, at 28. The Digest, a compilation of Roman law, pro-
vided, as translated from Latin:
It will also be [the advocate's] duty in most cases to allow the use of counsel by
petitioners who are: women, pupilli [orphans], those otherwise under a disabil-
ity, or those who are out of their minds, if anyone seeks this for them. Even if
there be no one to seek it, he ought to give them it anyway. But if someone
should represent himself as being unable to find an advocate because of his
opponent's power, it is just as much incumbent on the pro-consul to give him
one. But it is wrong for anyone to be oppressed by the sheer power of his
opponent ....
DIG. 1.16.9.5 (Ulpian, Officio Proconsulis 1), reprinted in 1 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 33-
34 (T. Mommsen & P. Kreuger eds., A. Watson trans. 1985).
The Digest further provided that:
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By the early part of the ninth century in Anglo-Saxon England,
churchmen were authorized to represent orphans and widows in
secular courts,'"8 as well as the poor generally in ecclesiastical
The praetor says: "If they do not have an advocate, I will appoint one." The
praetor is accustomed to show this consideration not only to the persons men-
tioned above but also to anyone else who for certain reasons, because of either
intrigues or duress on the part of his opponent, has not found an advocate.
DIG. 3.1.1.4 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 6), reprinted in 1 THE DIGEST OFJUSTINIAN, supra; at 78.
Other commentators, however, caution that "it is not clear that these provisions
were intended to help the poor rather than the more typical victims of the force and
fraud which characterized the lawsuits of the powerful, and in any case they hardly seem
to have affected the lot of the poor masses." Cappelletti & Gordley, supra note 94, at
350.
108. H. COHEN, supra note 103, at 158. As occurred in Rome, in England there was a
secular pro bono tradition, rooted in a hierarchical class structure, which predated, and
then co-existed with, the ecclesiastic legal aid practice. The Anglo-Saxon lord, like the
Roman patronus, was duty-bound to protect an often large coterie of dependents. Serfs
were "the mere chattels of their masters." The masters "represented" their serfs, and
their own derivative interests, in court. Id.; see also A. HARDING, supra note 106, at 13. In
a primitive version of respondeat superior, if a lord did not produce a defendant in
court, the lord often was obligated to pay compensation to a dependent's victim and
sometimes also to the King. Id. at 18-19.
The state also required the "landless man," who unlike the serf was "free in all
personal relations," to "have a surety or a patron to answer for his forthcoming or to
assert his rights in all matters of which the law took cognizance." H. COHEN, supra note
103, at 10. Maitland explained that it is the state that:
demands that the lordless man of whom no right can be had shall have a lord.
It makes the lord responsible for the appearance of his men in court to answer
accusations .... In some instances the state may go further; it may treat the
lord not merely as bound to produce his man but as responsible for his man's
evil deeds .... Originally a lord 'does right' to the demandant by producing in
a public court the man against whom the claim is urged; or he does it by satisfy-
ing the claim....
Id. at 9-10 (quoting F. MAITLAND, COMMENDATION AND PROTECTION (1897)) (citation
omitted). In the words of Maitland, " '[t]he landless man is represented in the courts by
his lord.' " Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
A third class, "the ceorl [churl] who possessed a little alod of his own" also "often,
perhaps generally, found it necessary to put himself under the protection of his powerful
neighbour, who would defend his rights and discharge his public services in considera-
tion of a rent paid or labour given or an acknowledgement of dependence." H. COHEN,
supra note 103, at 6-7 (quoting Bishop Stubbs).
The costs of independence were high; "a man 'regarded with suspicion by all the
people', said Canute, was to be put under surety by the king's reeve to answer any
charges brought against him, and if he had no surety he was to be slain and to lie in
unconsecrated ground." A. HARDING, supra note 106, at 22.
The Anglo-Saxon hierarchical structure served many purposes; for example, prior
to the Conquest, noblemen protected the lands of freeholders from invading Norsemen
and in return received both claim to lands and a standing army. Id. at 18. English kings,
however, "encouraged the reorganization of society round the great nobles," id. at 18-
19, in significant part because the lords discharged many functions considered public
today; they were, for example, early peacemakers, policemen, bailbondsmen, and sure-
ties for their dependents. Id. at 19. In short, "the lord [was] his [dependent's] defensor,
tutor, protector, advocatus, in a word, his warrantor." H. COHEN, supra note 103, at 9 (quot-
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courts.' 0 9 During the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries, the "cen-
turies of ignorance,""'  clerical advocates began appearing more
regularly in secular courts on behalf of the poor. 11
In the ecclesiastical courts, at least, representation of the poor
was a duty, not an egalitarian gesture. William of Drogheda was a
"practising advocatus in ecclesiastical courts" and "a teacher of law at
Oxford;""'2 but he is remembered best as a treatise writer on the
ing F. MAITLAND, supra) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). An important function
of the lord was advocacy in court. Quadripartitus, "the best authority on pre-Norman
law and procedure," id. at 4, called the lord in court an advocatus. Cohen concludes that
"in Q's advocatus we have the rudimentary germ of legal representation in this country
[England]." Id. at 11.
The representative's role in court was mixed; he might warrant his dependent's
honesty and good character; stand as a surety for him; "come forward as his compurga-
tor" and "swear a crushing oath;" or "take upon himself the task of defending an action
to which his man was subjected." Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
After the Norman Conquest, the clerical advocates of the Church some-
times challenged the feudal lords. "[T]he bishop and the parish priest . . .
could help the Saxon serf and the Norman villein in various ways .... They
stood between him and the oppression of his feudal superior .... They were
his advocates in the courts of law ... "
Id. at 45-46 (quoting 2 STEVENSON, CHRONICON MONAST. DE ABINGDON, lxv-vii, §§ 71-72
(1858)).
109. "In 1072, the bishops ceased to sit in the shire-court, for William I issued an
ordinance setting up separate ecclesiastical courts .... The mutual encroachments of
the secular and ecclesiastical jurisdictions were to cause endless conflict in medieval
England .... " A. HARDING, supra note 106, at 35.
110. H. COHEN, supra note 103, at 159. During part of this time, the Church (and itslaw) provided England with a nationalizing coherence and stability. The secular govern-
ment was fragmented. Prior to Alfred, there was a "heptarchy;" "several kings reigned
in different parts of England at the same time." A. HARDING, supra note 106, at 19.
111. "Between the ninth and thirteenth centuries a number of Church canons and
regulations forbade ecclesiastical lawyers to pursue a general practice in the temporal
courts. It, however, was customary to except from these prohibitions cases in which thelegally skilled ecclesiastics represented or assisted poor people." Maguire, Poverty and
Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 365 (1923) (footnotes omitted). In 1179, the Lat-
eran Council, "which issued a more specific prohibition [and implicit grant of authority]
to the same effect, made an exception on behalf of poor persons who could not manage
their own causes." E. MATrHEWS & A. OULTON, LEGAL AID AND ADVICE UNDER THE
LEGAL AID ACTS 1949 TO 1964, at 9 (1971). The Church's repeated prohibitions largely
were ineffective.
In England in the thirteenth century many professed both the civil and
common law and many practised both in the common-law courts and in the
ecclesiastical courts. Many of the practitioners were in orders. But in that cen-
tury began the discouragement of the clergy from practising law and the Fifth
Lateran Council (1512-1517) forbade their acting as advocates in the secular
courts.
5 R. POUND, supra note 91, at 699-700.
112. H. COHEN, supra note 103, at 101 (footnote omitted). Maitland later referred to
William as "half priest, half lawyer." Id.
[VOL. 49:18
1990] MANDATORY PRO BONO IN CIVIL CASES: FOR 39
craft and responsibilities of the ecclesiastical court advocate." 3 In
his treatise, he describes finding "legal aid for poor suitors" as the
probable "business" of ecclesiastical judges,' and providing legal
aid as the clear duty of an advocatus:
The adv. who refuses his services [gratuitously] when
the judge asks for them, shall lose his right of audience
(and perhaps, for ever): where the old praetor used to say
"if you have not an adv. I will give you one," to-day the
formula is "if you have no money to buy consilium I will give
it to you" . . . and to the poor client he must give advice
"intuitu dei" . . ..
As a private bar developed," 6 the duty to represent the poor
became partly its responsibility. For example, the Magna Carta pro-
vided: "We neither sell, nor deny, nor delay, to any person, equity
or justice."' "l 7 And, the University of Oxford decreed: "If anyone
should have been harmed let him present his complaint to the chan-
cery with his doctor or, if he is indigent, with his advocate.""11
8
The private advocate's pro bono responsibility was enhanced as
English law became increasingly complex. Normally, to invoke the
jurisdiction of the courts, litigants were required to obtain formally
composed writs that were drafted with the most fastidious attention
113. He wrote Summa Aurea de OrdineJudiciorum, probably in 1239. Id.
114. Id. at 581.
115. Id. at 572 (citation omitted).
116. Pound states that:
In England, by the time of Edward I, the common-law courts were well estab-
lished and the legal profession was definitely formative. The formative period
extends from Edward I (1272) to Henry VI (1422). In the reign of Edward I
there was a body of lawyers regularly practicing in the courts. They were of two
types: attorneys and pleaders. If one appeared by attorney, the attorney repre-
sented him. If he had the assistance of a pleader, he was present by himself or
his attorney, but the pleader supported the case by his learning, ingenuity and
zeal. This was the difference between the agent for litigation and the advocate
which goes back to antiquity. As in all systems representation in litigation was
at first thought of as something exceptional and developed slowly. Appoint-
ment of an attorney was considered unusual and only allowed on special
grounds and by formal authorization in court or by special writ .... The dis-
tinction between the pleaders, who later became the serjeants, and the attor-
neys was sharply drawn ....
5 R. POUND, supra note 91, at 685-86.
117. "Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus aut differemus rectum veljusticiam." MACNA
CARTA, ch. 40. In the reissue of the Magna Carta, ch. 40 became ch. 29. But see Maguire,
supra note 111,' for a restricted view of what King John meant to concede by this
language.
118. H. COHEN, supra note 103, at 24 n.(r) (English translation).
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to formalistic detail."9 Legal help from the cadre of professional
pleadors, initially called "countors" or "narratores" and later
"serjeants,"' 120 was essential to avoid hypertechnical drafting errors
that doomed meritorious, but imperfectly composed writs.121
Primarily as a concession to indigent litigants, the Justices of
Eyre adjudicated claims set forth in very informally drafted Bills in
Eyre.122 However, a countor or narratore, however, significantly in-
creased the chance that a Bill in Eyre would be successful, a fact
recognized by numerous pro se litigants who prayed in the starkest
terms that the court appoint a countor or a narratore for them. 123
The language of the oath of the serjeants, the most respected advo-
119. See id. at 173-75.
120. The countors (from conteur, or "storyteller," in French) and narratores were
laymen not clergy. J. BAKER, THE ORDER OF SERJEANTS AT LAW 13 (1984). They appear
in the records of 13th century court proceedings. Id. By the 14th century, they were a
profession: limited members of a closed group, each of whom was admitted to practice
before a single court, who had their own disciplinary mechanism and wore a distinctive
costume ("coif"). Id. at 16-17. By the end of the 14th century, countors and narratores
became known as servientes ad legem, or "serjeants at law." See id. at 2 1-27. They contin-
ued to serve "at the bar 'by pleading for pennies and pounds the law.' " Id. at 27 (quot-
ing W. LANGLAND, PIERS PLOWMAN 38 (D. Pearsall ed. 1978)).
121. See H. COHEN, supra note 103, at 174. The writ before the court, "could not be
subsequently amended in form, and the smallest error, even a grammatical error in the
Latin in which it was written, might be fatal to the plaintiff's case . I..." Id. at 173.
122. See id. at 174. The King's representatives were the justices of these traveling
courts.
One of their functions was to right wrongs of every description which might go
unredressed because the ordinary courts were too slow, too expensive, too far
away, or too much under the thumb of the wrong-doers. The Justices in Eyre
were also to deal appropriately with cases in which the common law provided
no remedies. Numerous private complaints were presented not (as at common
law) by writ, but by bill. Whether or no[t] the use of these bills was confined to
the poor, it is certain that poor persons presented a great many of them.
Maguire, supra note 111, at 367 (footnotes omitted). Quoting W.C. Bolland in part,
Maguire concludes that this flexible procedure was " 'the very beginning of our English
equity' " and "the beginning, or one of the beginnings, of poor men's courts." Id.
(quoting W. BOLLAND, THE YEAR BOOKS 57 (1921)).
By proceeding by "bill", rather than "writ", indigent litigants avoided payment of
the equivalent of a filing fee, as well as the rigorous pleading requirements. A. HAR-
DING, supra note 106, at 58.
Before the writ there had to come, of course, the simple complaint of injustice,
the petition to Chancery for a writ. If the plaintiff was poor, or there was no
time to get to Chancery and back before the justices in eyre left the county, the
requirement of a writ might be waived and the complaint heard directly. Such
complaints or petitions eventually came to be written down as bills ....
Id. at 57-58 (emphasis in original).
123. See Maguire, supra note 111, at 368.
William, son of Hugh of Smethumilne, says: "And I pray you, for your soul's
sake, that you will give me remedy of this, for I am so poor that I can pay for no
counter .... [S]on of Alan Plotman, speaking for himself and his mother for
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cates of the day, directly informed them that they were obligated to
discharge this responsibility:
Ye shall swear that well and truly ye shall serve the king's
people as one of the serjeants at the law. And ye shall truly
counsel them that ye shall be retained with, after your cun-
ning. And ye shall not defer, tract or delay their causes
willingly for covetise of money or other thing that may turn
you to profit. And ye shall give attendance accordingly. As
God you help, and his saints.'
24
The public service promise in the serjeant's oath was more than
hortatory. Dating from the thirteenth century, they were "required"
to "plead for a poor man" in any court in which they practiced. This
included a number of common law courts, as well as the courts of
the chancellor and council. 1 25 "[I]f a serjeant decline[d] to plead for
a poor man when the court order[ed] him"' 26 to do so, he could be
separated from the bar.'
2 7
During the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, the
Crown, recognizing "[t]he notion of personal sovereignty carried
with it a paternal, or at least a proprietary, duty to enforce fairness
and right between subject and subject,"' 1 8 sponsored numerous re-
forms intended to make justice equally available to rich and poor.' 29
that they are poor folk," asks "that you will, an it please you, grant them a
serjeant for them."
Id. (citations omitted).
124. J. BAKER, supra note 120, at 88. "Serjeants were in honour bound to advise pau-
pers gratuitously." E. MATTHEWS & A. OULTON, supra note 111, at 11 n. 14.
125. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 491 (1936) (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 491 n.4.
127. In French, "estrange del barr." Id. (quoting S.C. Brian, C.J.).
128. Maguire, supra note 11, at 366.
129. England sought to ameliorate the consequences of poverty by vesting the Chan-
cellor with jurisdiction over the claims of litigants who were "too poor to sue at common
law;" giving additional special responsibilities for poor litigants to the Star Chamber and
Court of Requests (the "Court of Poor Men's Causes"), divisions of the King's Council;
disregarding otherwise fatal pleading errors by poor pro se litigants, at least in the Courts
of Eyre; and excusing the poor from the requirements that they "pledge security" or pay
costs to file lawsuits. E. MATTHEWS & A. OULTON, supra note 111, at 9-10; see also
Maguire, supra note 111, at 369.
. The Court of Requests was a particularly "enlightened" 15th, 16th, and 17th cen-
tury "effort to bring justice to the poor." Id.
Poverty was the main reason for presenting bills in the king's courts rather than
purchasing writs, and the king always felt a special duty to give justice to the
poor. In 1483, under Richard III, there was already a second clerk of the coun-
cil with responsibility for 'the custody, registration and expedition of bills, re-
quests and supplications of poor persons'.
A. HARDING, supra note 106, at 154-55 (footnote omitted). Like our contemporary "peo-
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One commentator summarizes these three centuries, by saying:
"The humanitarianism of the English kings from 1216 to 1495 is
rather surprising. They did or meant to do much more toward help-
ing their poor subjects enforce legal claims than many of our states
are doing today."'
The culmination of these reforms was the enactment in 1495 of
11 Hen. 7, ch. 12.1 " The right to counsel granted by the Act was
broad. It applied to "every pouer persone" who "shall have [a]
pies courts," the Court of Requests' mass justice workload of causes included many rela-
tively small commercial, and landlord-tenant cases. Maguire, supra note 111, at 369.
There is no doubt, however, that Requests did something to protect the small
tenant-farmer and possibly to protect the lesser artisans of the towns, at a time
of social upheaval, when enclosing landlords were ignoring manorial customs
and imposing arbitrary fines and forfeitures, and when guilds were becoming
more monopolistic.
A. HARDING, supra note 106, at 155 (footnote omitted).
130. Maguire, supra note 11, at 370. Compare Maguire's less generous critique of
the implementation of these reforms. Id. at 371-72.
131. The Act provided:
An Acte to admytt such psons as are poore to sue in forma paupis.
Prayen the Commons in this present parliament assembled, that where the
King our Sovreign Lord of his most gracious disposition willeth and intendeth
indifferent justice to be had and ministered according to his common laws, to
all his true subjects as well to the poor as rich, which poor subjects be not of
ability ne power to sue according to the laws of this land for the redress ofinjuries and wrongs to them daily done, as well concerning their persons and
their inheritance as other causes: (2) for remedy whereof, in the behalf of the
poor persons of this land, not able to sue for their remedy after the course of
the common law; be it ordained and enacted by your Highness and by the lords
spiritual and temporal, and the commons, in this present parliament assembled
and by authority of the same, that every poor person or persons, which have, or
hereafter shall have cause of action or actions against any person or persons
within the realm, shall have, by the discretion of the chancellor of this realm,
for the time being, writ or writs original, and writ of subpoena, according to the
nature of their causes, therefore nothing paying to your Highness for the seals
of the same, nor to any person for the writing of the same writ and writs to behereafter sued; (3) and that the said chancellor for the same time being shall
assign such of the clerks which shall do and use the making and writing of the
same writs, to write the same ready to be sealed, and also learned counsel and
attornies for the same, without any reward taking therefor: (4) And after the
said writ or writs be returned, if it be afore the King in his bench, the justices
there shall assign to the same poor person or persons, counsel learned, by their
discretions, which shall give their counsels, nothing taking for the same: (5)
And likewise the justices shall appoint attorney and attornies for the same poor
person and persons, and all other officers requisite and necessary to be had for
the speed of the said suits to be had and made, which shall do their duties
without any reward for their counsels help, and business in the same: (6) And
the same law and order shall be observed and kept of all such suits to be made
afore the King's justices of his common place, and barons of the exchequer,
and all other justices in the courts of record where any such suits shall be.
II Hen. 7, ch. 12 (1495).
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cause of accion" against "any persone" who may be "within the
realme." It provided for the pro bono appointment of "learned
Councell and attorneys," both to draft and prepare writs and litigate
the cases. It governed in "all such suytes to be made afore the
Kingis Justices," "Barons of his Eschequer," "and all otherJustices
in Courtes of Recorde." 132
Remarkably, this statute, in partnership with 23 Hen. 8, ch.
15, 133 was the backbone of the English legal aid system for almost
four hundred years. Although the number of indigent clients who
benefitted from the statute was limited greatly by restrictive inter-
pretations of it'" 4 and the absence of a coherent and uniform imple-
mentation program, the statute did result in the appointment of
counsel to represent the poor in many civil matters 135 until, in 1883,
it was repealed in favor of a more comprehensive legal aid
program. 136
2. The Incorporation of the Historic Mandatory Pro Bono Rule in Con-
temporary Law: The Maryland Example.-When the English settlers
came to the New World they carried much of the English law with
them. Much of that law was embodied in state constitutions and
declarations of rights. The pro bono statute, 1 1 Hen. 7, ch. 12, is
one law the settlers carried to Maryland, and there is a strong argu-
ment that it is Maryland's law today.
Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, provides:
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Com-
mon Law of England .... and to the benefit of such of the
English statutes as existed on the Fourth day ofJuly, seven-
teen hundred and seventy-six; and which, by experience,
have been found applicable to their local and other circum-
132. Id. See generally E. MATTHEWS & A. OULTON, supra note 111, at 10-11.
133. Enacted in 1531, it "exempted an unsuccessful poor plaintiff from liability for
costs ...." E. MATTHEWS & A. OULTON, supra note 111, at 11. In lieu of costs, there was
the theoretical power vested in the judiciary to order unsuccessful litigants to be physi-
cally punished. This power was seldom, if ever, exercised and was a dead letter by the
seventeenth century. Id.
134. During the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries, the 1495 Statute was limited by the
English courts in several important respects. Those worth more than five pounds were
ineligible to use it. It was applied, at least in the common law courts, only to indigent
plaintiffs, not poor defendants. And, a litigant had to obtain a counsel's opinion, at his
own expense, finding that his cause was meritorious. Id.
135. For an interesting discussion of the use of 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12 (1495), see BRITISH
STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND, ACCORDING TO THE REPORT THEREOF MADE TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE LATE CHANCELLOR KILTY 346-48 (W. Coe ed. 1912) [herein-
after BRITISH STATUTES].
136. Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict., ch. 49.
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stances, and have been introduced, used and practiced by
the Courts of Law and Equity.1 3 7
The early Maryland courts were charged with determining
which English statutes were incorporated into the common law.
This was a difficult task because there was a differential "incorpora-
tion" standard. The original Declaration of Rights of 17763' cre-
ated an ambiguous distinction between statutes passed before the
settlement of the Province, and statutes passed between 1632 and
1776. l1
9
In 1809, the General Assembly sought to clarify the "incorpora-
tion" standard and identify which English statutes had been made
part of Maryland's law.' 4 ° It passed a resolution asking the State's
Chancellor, William Kilty, to determine which English statutes were
part of Maryland's common law.' 4 ' Kilty's Report, published in 1811,
contains a comprehensive list of British statutes that had been made
part of Maryland's common law. 142
137. MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. V. Though this article is construed broadly, the courts
have noted a sharp distinction between received common law and received English stat-
utes. In Dashiell v. Attorney-General, 5 H. &J. 392 (1822), a leading case on this issue,
the court stressed that "the common law is adopted in mass," without any restrictive
words. Id. at 401. But with regard to the English Statutes, see infra note 139.
138. MD. DECL. OF RTS. art. V (1776) which read in pertinent part:
That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of Eng-
land, and the trial by jury, according to the course of the law, and to the benefit
of such English Statutes as existed at the time of their first emigration, and
which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other cir-
cumstances, and of such others as have been since made in England, or Great
Britain, and have been introduced, used and practiced by the courts of law or
equity.
139. See generally Steiner, The Adoption of English Law in Maryland, 8 YALE L.J. 353, 354
(1899).
In regard to Statutes of England, the old Constitution made two classes
which were to be in force: Those which "existed at the time" of the "first emi-
gration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable," and those
made later and "introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law and
Equity."
Id. (quoting Dashiell, 5 H. &J. at 401-02).
140. See A REPORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES AS EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE
FIRST EMIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND, AND WHICH BY EXPERIENCE HAVE BEEN
FOUND APPLICABLE TO THEIR LOCAL AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES; AND OF SUCH OTHERS
AS HAVE BEEN MADE IN ENGLAND OR GREAT-BRITAIN, AND HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED, USED
AND PRACTISED, BY THE COURTS OF LAW OR EQUITY; AND ALSO ALL SUCH PARTS OF THE
SAME AS MAY BE PROPER TO BE INTRODUCED AND INCORPORATED INTO THE BODY OF THE
STATUTE LAW OF THE STATE i (1811) [hereinafter KILTY'S REPORT] (a report made by the
late Chancellor of Maryland, William Kilty).
141. Id.
142. In the introduction, Kilty wrote:
"It is a general principle, that the first settlers of Maryland brought with them all
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The "most important" criterion Kilty used to analyze those
British statutes that had not been incorporated expressly into Mary-
land's law by an "express declaration of the parliament" or "provin-
cial acts of Assembly"' 43 was whether the statute had been
"[i]ntroduced, [u]sed and [p]ractised, by the [c]ourts of [l]aw and
[e]quity." ' 44 Kilty "grounded" his report "on a careful perusal and
consideration of the statutes at large, and on an examination, as far
as it was practicable, of the records of the former provincial court,
and the legislative and executive proceedings of the government
before the revolution."'
14 5
Applying his test, Kilty divided the British statutes into three
categories: (1) English Statutes existing at the time of the first emi-
gration of the people of this State, which have not been found, by
experience, applicable to their circumstances;' 4 6 (2) Statutes and
parts of Statutes which have been found applicable but are not
proper to be introduced and incorporated into the body of the Stat-
ute Law of this State;' 47 and, (3) Statutes and parts of Statutes which
English statutes made before the charter, and in force at the time, which were
applicable to the local and other circumstances of the province, and the courts of
justice always decided the applicability of any statute, and of consequence its
extention. I have understood that the judges under the old government laid it
down as a general rule, that all statutes for the administration of justice, whether
made before or since the charter, so far as they were applicable, should be
adopted by them."
Id. at vi (emphasis in original) (quoting letter from Mr. Justice Samuel Chase to Judge
Tilghman).
143. Id.
144. Id. at i. Explaining his criterion, Kilty quoted from "the late case of 'Whittington
and Polk'," in which the "general court" said:
"None of the English statutes which passed anterior to the first emigration of
the inhabitants of Maryland have been adopted by the constitution of Mary-
land, and incorporated with the laws, but such as have been found by experi-
ence applicable to our local and other circumstances; and it does not appear to
the court, there can be any other safe criterion by which the applicability of
such statutes to our local and other circumstances can be ascertained and estab-
lished, but that of having been used and practised under in this state."
Id. at vi-vii.
Kilty, however, added:
[i]n the application of this criterion to the several statutes as passed in review, it
must however be observed, that many statutes relating to rights and rules of
property have been tacitly and without contest acquiesced in, and that many
have been used and practised under without the sanction of any express deci-
sion of the courts.
Id. at vii.
145. Id. at v.
146. Id.; see also id. at 9-136.
147. Id. at 139-201. "[M]ainly those Statutes whose existence depended on the con-
nection with Great Britain, or on a monarchical form of government, or which were
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have been found applicable and are proper to be incorporated into
the body of the Statute Law of the State. 14 8
Kilty included within this last category, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12-the
English statute that created a mandatory pro bono duty in 1495.141
Kilty gave as the reason for his decision, "I have found some in-
stances of this statute being practiced under in the years 1664 and
1672; and although cases of this kind do not frequently occur, there
is no reason why it should not be continued, together with 23 Hen.
8, ch. 15, on the same subject."' 150
There were other apparent "instances" of "this statute being
practiced"'' in addition to the two that Kilty found. In 1721, the
Maryland Court of Appeals granted the petition of John and Mary
Smith that "Council" be "assigned" Mary's son William, a minor, in
an estate matter involving the "heirs and representatives of Colonel
Thomas Ennalls." The court found that, in apparent compliance
with 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12, the Smiths had alleged they were not
"[w]orth in their estate to the value of five pounds Sterling."'' 5 2
It is apparent, therefore, that if Kilty's Report is authoritative,
then, absent an express contrary statement by the Maryland General
Assembly or Court of Appeals, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12 remains the law in
Maryland. Kilty's Report is an authoritative source for determining
which English statutes were incorporated into the common law of
Maryland. The Constitutional Convention of 1851 implicitly ratified
Kilty's work by merging the two-category provision of the Declara-
tion of Rights of 1776 into one clause: Kilty's Clause. Although the
Report of the Constitutional Convention of 1851 153 is silent on whether
Kilty's Report theretofore had been implemented by the judiciary and
General Assembly, the "existence of Kilty's report and the habit of
contrary to laws subsequently passed by the General Assembly, or to the relation of the
State to the Federal Union." Steiner, supra note 139, at 358.
148. KiLTY's REPORT, supra note 140, at 205-53. In all, Kilty found 191 statutes appli-
cable and proper to be incorporated. See also Steiner, supra note 139, at 359.
149. See KiLTY's REPORT, supra note 140, at 229.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS 303 (T. Bond ed. 1933). In
1724, the Maryland Court of Appeals apparently considered a similar request for ap-
pointment of counsel to prosecute an appeal in a civil case from John Bagby, who made
"Oath that he was not worth five pounds Ster[ling] money his wearing apparel ex-
cepted." Id. at 433. The 1883 British Parliament "liberalized" the 1495 statute, 11
Henry 7, ch. 12, "by raising the maximum capital requirement for receiving aid to 25
pounds from the absurdly low level of 5 pounds where it had remained since 1495, and
by opening the procedure to all litigants rather than plaintiffs only." Cappelletti & Gor-
dley, supra note 94, at 356.
153. 1 MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION: DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS (1851).
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referring to it by lawyers may have been one reason why the Consti-
tution of 1851 ... consolidated the two classes of the old clause into
one.""'54 Because the Convention of 1851 adopted Kilty's standard,
it logically follows that the Convention, by implication, also adopted
Kilty's conclusions.
The contemporary significance of Kilty's Report also is apparent
from the deferential treatment it receives from Maryland courts.
Only twice has the Maryland Court of Appeals incorporated statutes
that Kilty's Report did not incorporate. 155 More importantly, there is
not a single reported case in which the court (or any Maryland court
in a reported decision), has overruled a decision by Kilty to include
a specific English statute within Maryland's common law. In this re-
spect, from the time that it was first published in 1811, Kilty's Report
consistently has been cited as conclusive authority.156 More re-
cently, the Court of Special Appeals in State v. Magliano,157 restated
the importance of Kilty: " 'The only evidence to be found on [Brit-
ish Statutes] is furnished by Kilty's Report of the Statute * * *. That
book was compiled, printed, and distributed, under the sanction of
the State, for the use of its officers, and is a safe guide in exploring
an otherwise very dubious path.' "158
In sum, the inclusion of 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12, in both Kilty's Report,
and its successor, Alexander's British Statutes in Force in Maryland,159
indicates that mandatory pro bono is part of the law that Maryland
(and probably many other states) "received" from England.' 60
Through Rule 6.2 of the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional
154. Steiner, supra note 139, at 359.
155. See Shriver v. Maryland, 9 G. &J. 1, 11-12 (1837) (holding that 9 & 10 Will. 3, ch.
15 was applicable, contravening Kilty's opinion); Silbey v. Williams, 3 G. & J. 52, 63
(1830) (holding that 4 & 5 W. & M., ch. 24 was applicable, disagreeing with Kilty).
156. See Koones v. Maddox, 2 H. & G. 106 (1827); Dashiell v. Attorney-General, 5 H.
&J. 392 (1822).
157. 7 Md. App. 286, 255 A.2d 470 (1969).
158. Id. at 293, 255 A.2d at 474 (quoting Dashiell, 5 H. &J. at 403) (footnote omitted).
159. BRITISH STATUTES, supra note 135, at 346-48. In Maryland Constitutional Law, Al-
fred S. Niles wrote that Kilty's Report is obsolete, "but its place has been taken by 'Alexan-
der's British Statutes,' which is now our 'guide.'" A. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 17 (1915).
160. See, e.g., Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. 289, 292-93, 168 P. 135, 136-37
(1917) (interpreting statute making the common law of England, so far as it is consistent
with state constitution and laws, the law in California); E. BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN
AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at 25-26 (1964) (indicating several states, including Mary-
land, may have "received" 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12).
Assuming, arguendo, that Kilty's Report retains its authoritative character, has 11 Hen.
7, ch. 12 been repealed in Maryland? It plainly has not been repealed expressly. The
Maryland General Assembly has repealed British Statutes by expressly naming the stat-
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Conduct, the Maryland Court of Appeals has given 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12
a modern day voice. Rule 6.2 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person ex-
cept for good cause .... ,,161 In appointing counsel to represent
indigent litigants in civil cases, courts might rely upon both these
specific sources of appointment authority-I 1 Hen. 7, ch. 12 and
Rule 6.2-as well as their inherent authority to take those steps that
are reasonably necessary to fairly administer justice.
ute and expressly repealing it. See, e.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-114 (1988). It
has not done so with respect to 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12.
It could be argued that the mandatory pro bono rule codified in 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12
has been superseded by the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.1,
which makes pro bono work permissive in Maryland. The Maryland Court of Appeals,
however, has suggested that only the judiciary, sitting in its judicial-not regulatory-
capacity, or the General Assembly is empowered to modify received English law. See,
e.g., Ireland v. State, 310 Md. 328, 331, 529 A.2d 365, 366 (1987) ("The determination
of the nature of the common law as it existed in England in 1776, and as it then pre-
vailed in Maryland either practically or potentially, and the determination of what part of
that common law is consistent with the spirit of Maryland's Constitution and her polit-
ical institutions, are to be made by this Court."); Moexly v. Acker, 294 Md. 47, 52-53,
447 A.2d 857, 860 (1982) (common law forcible entry and detainer no longer requires
force). But see Hall v. State, 57 Md. App. 1, 12, 468 A.2d 1015, 1021 (1983) ("The
emphasized portion of Rule 712(a) can only be regarded as intending and effecting a
clear departure from the caselaw that had developed up to that point" (emphasis added)),
aff'd, 302 Md. 806, 490 A.2d 1287 (1985).
Moreover, the pro bono duty imposed by 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12 is triggered by a court
when it appoints counsel to represent an indigent litigant, and the Maryland Lawyers'
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.2 expressly preserves counsel's duty to accept pro
bono appointments absent "good cause":
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a per-
son except for good cause, such as:
(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the rules of pro-
fessional conduct or other law;
(b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial
burden on the lawyer; or
(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to
impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the
client.
THE MARYLAND LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1989).
Thus, if the Maryland Court of Appeals can "repeal" received law in an exercise of
its rule-making power, it appears to have preserved, not repealed, 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12.
161. THE MARYLAND LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.2 (1989).
Ethical Consideration 2-29 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which is
still applicable in many states, provides that "[w]hen a lawyer is appointed by a court or
requested by a bar association to undertake representation of a person unable to obtain
counsel, whether for financial or other reasons, he should not seek to be excused from
undertaking the representation except for compelling reasons." MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-29 (1981).
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C. The Inherent Power of the Courts to Appoint Counsel for Indigent
Litigants in Civil Cases
Courts have long recognized their inherent authority to sanc-
tion parties, witnesses, and attorneys for contempt, 62 to regulate
and discipline those who practice law before them,' 63 to promulgate
rules of procedure, 64 to assess attorney fees against counsel' 65 or a
party,' 66 to refer cases to magistrates or auditors, 67 to admit a pris-
oner to bail, 168 and even to order the legislature to expend funds,' 69
all for the purpose of administering justice-the chief business of
the judiciary-and all in the absence of statutory authority.' 7 0 If a
162. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 615 (1960) ("From the very beginning
of this Nation and throughout its history the power to convict for criminal contempt has
been deemed an essential and inherent aspect of the very existence of our courts."); see
also Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874) ("The power to punish for
contempt is inherent in all courts .... The moment the courts of the United States were
called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became pos-
sessed of this power."); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 302 (1888) ("[c]ourts of the United
States, from the very nature of their institution, possess the power to fine for con-
tempt"); Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924) (contempt power is essen-
tial to the fair administration ofjustice).
163. See, e.g., Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 275 Or. 279, 286, 550 P.2d 1218, 1222
(1976) ("[I]t is part of the inherent power of the judiciary to determine qualifications for
practicing law .... "); McLaughlin v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 465 Pa. 104, 113,
348 A.2d 376, 380 (1975) ("It is the right and duty of a court to discipline its members
who appear before it guilty of wrongdoing .... Courts have an inherent power to make
and follow rules governing such matters .... ") (quoting In re Disbarment Proceedings,
321 Pa. 81, 101, 184 A. 59, 68 (1936) (citations omitted)).
164. See, e.g., Franquez v. United States, 604 F.2d 1239, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1979).
165. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67 (1980).
166. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(1975); see also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) ("inherent equitable power").
167. See, e.g., Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 314 (1920) ("The inherent power of a
federal court to invoke such aid is the same whether the court sits in equity or law.").
168. See, e.g.,Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528, 531 (3d Cir. 1955).
169. See Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County, 386 Mich. 1, 32, 190 N.W.2d 228,
239-40 (1971) (judiciary has inherent power to compel county to expend reasonable
sums necessary to exercise of constitutionally assigned functions ofjudicial branch), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 923 (1972).
170. For a scholarly discussion of the various types of "inherent authority," see Eash
v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the court stated:
This use of inherent power, which might be termed irreducible inherent au-
thority, encompasses an extremely narrow range of authority involving activity
so fundamental to the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal that to
divest the court of absolute command within this sphere is really to render
meaningless the terms "court" and "judicial power."
Id. at 562 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (implied powers "necessary to the exercise of all others..."). But
see ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978) (inherent
powers limited to those required and essential to administration of justice) (citing Ex
parte Peterson, 253 U.S. at 312). See generally Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary,
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power is necessary to allow a court to function as a court, it is within
that court's inherent authority. 71 The power to appoint attorneys
to represent indigent litigants in criminal cases 172 is but one in-
stance of the proper exercise of this inherent power.
In Powell v. Alabama,t17 the Supreme Court stated that, in a capi-
tal trial, "[t]he duty of the trial court to appoint counsel under such
circumstances is clear ... ; and its power to do so, even in the ab-
sence of a statute, can not be questioned. Attorneys are officers of
the court, and are bound to render service when required by such an
appointment." 174 The rationale behind the near-universal accept-
21 A.B.A.J. 635 (1935); Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal
Contempt in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010
(1924).
171. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (an "inherent power" is
"governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to man-
age their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases"
(footnote omitted)); Laughlin v. Clephane, 77 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D.D.C. 1947) ("court
of record possesses the inherent power to provide [itself with] the necessary assistance
as a means of conducting its business with reasonable dispatch;" "court itself may deter-
mine the necessity").
172. See Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 62, 63 (1860) ("Counsel are not considered at
liberty to reject.., the cause of the defenseless, because no provision for their compen-
sation is made by law."); Elam v.Johnson, 48 Ga. 348, 350 (1873) (lawyer has common
law and statutory duty never to reject "the cause of the defenseless or oppressed" (cita-
tion omitted)); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Il1. 2d 24, 28, 219 N.E.2d 337, 340
(1966) (inherent power ofjudiciary to regulate practice of law and conduct orderly ad-
ministration of criminal justice includes power to appoint attorney for accused); State ex
rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 65-66 (Mo. 1981) (tradition of profession of law
allows court to turn to the private bar-"without apology"-when public defender pro-
gram insufficiently funded), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399,
217 A.2d 441 (1966) (obligation of lawyer to defend indigent without charge part of
substantive common law); House v. Whitis, 64 Tenn. 690, 692 (1875) ("The court has a
right to command the services of counsel for persons unable to pay, in civil as well as
criminal cases." (citations omitted)); cf. Knox County Council v. State ex rel. McCormick,
217 Ind. 493, 501, 29 N.E.2d 405, 409 (1940) (" 'An attorney of the Court is under no
obligation, honorary or otherwise, to volunteer his services.' " (quoting Webb v. Baird,
6 Ind. 13, 18 (1854))); Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473, 476 (Iowa 1850)
("Where an act of service is performed in obedience to direct mandate of statutory law,
under the direction of a tribunal to which the enforcement of that law is committed,
reasonable compensation to the person who performs that service is a necessary inci-
dent; otherwise, the arm of the law will be too short to accomplish its designs.").
173. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
174. Id. at 73; see also T. COOLEY, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 700 (8th
ed. 1927). The Court also relied upon Hendryx v. State, 130 Ind. 265, 29 N.E. 1131
(1892), in which "there was no statute authorizing the assignment of an attorney to
defend an indigent person accused of crime, but the court held that such an assignment
was necessary to accomplish the ends of public justice, and that the court possessed the
inherent power to make it." Powell, 287 U.S. at 72; see also Annotation, Right of Attorney
Appointed by Court for Indigent Accused to, and Courts Power to Award, Compensation by Public, in
Absence of Statute or Court Rule, 21 A.L.R. 3d 819, 822 ("The [appointed] attorney's right
[VOL. 49:18
1990] MANDATORY PRO BONO IN CIVIL CASES: FOR
ance of appointments to serve as defense counsel in a criminal case
is that "there is a preexisting duty to provide such service. The
source of this duty is a lawyer's status as an officer of the court. 175
While the status of an attorney as an "officer of the court" has been
subject to a revisionist critique, 176 the duty owed to the court is the
same whether the case is civil or criminal, if "necessary to accom-
plish the ends of public justice. ' 1 77 The crucial factor is not
whether the case is criminal or civil;' 7 1 instead, the court's inherent
power to appoint counsel should be shaped by the need of the liti-
gant for representation, the litigant's interest at stake in the pro-
ceeding, and, most importantly, the impact of the litigant's pro se
status on the court's capacity to administer justice fairly.' 79 The in-
to compensation has been denied on the basis of one or both of two theories: that
rendering gratuitous services when appointed by the court is the duty of the attorney as
an officer of the court, and that, concomitant to receiving a license to practice law, the
attorney consents to render gratuitous services when appointed to represent indigent
defendants.").
175. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1215 (8th Cir. 1982) (footnote & cita-
tion omitted). Williamson relied upon United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966), in which it was stated that
[an applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to be aware
of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, and to know that one of
these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of the court obligated to represent
indigents for little or no compensation upon court order.
Id. at 635.
176. See In re Cooper, 22 N.Y. 67, 87-88 (1860). But see People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,
248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928), in which ChiefJudge Cardozo noted that barristers,
although not technically officers of the court, were still subject to the supervision of the
bench in its capacity as "visitors" to the Inns. Id. at 472-73, 162 N.E. at 490. The "of-
ficer of the court" and "inherent authority" doctrines are closely intertwined. See In re
Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985) ("Courts have long recognized an inherent authority
to suspend or disbar lawyers. This inherent power derives from the lawyer's role as an
officer of the court which granted admission." (citing Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333, 378-79 (1867)); Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824)).
177. Powell, 287 U.S. at 72.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408, 1412 (3d Cir. 1988)
("[C]ourts have upheld their inherent power to appoint counsel, sometimes even over
counsel's objection, to represent defendants in need of such representation." (citations
omitted)).
179. Such a contextual definition of a court's inherent authority to appoint counsel is
consistent with the rules of procedure that govern civil litigation. For example, Rule 83
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part, that "the district judges and
magistrates may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules
or those of the district in which they act." FED. R. Civ. P. 83; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071
(1982) ("The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may from
time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business" which "shall be consistent
with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme
Court."). If a federal district court were to adopt a pro bono requirement by local rule,
it would not be "inconsistent" with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Frazier v.
Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987) (evaluating the validity of a local district court rule by ask-
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herent judicial power to appoint counsel should extend at least to
those civil cases in which representation is essential to produce the
facts that are necessary for reasonable decision-making.
The inherent judicial power to appoint counsel for indigent liti-
gants also is informed by the indigent litigant's constitutional right
to legal help. In this respect, the court's inherent power and its duty
overlap, although they are not co-extensive.' 80 All persons have a
constitutional right to effective "access to the courts."' 8 ' That right
implements government's duty to make its law accessible to its citi-
zens. A limited, contextual and subsidiary right to legal help some-
times is a component of-or the remedy to implement-the broader
access to court right.' 82 This subsidiary right is the means by which
government now implements the broader access right for institu-
tionalized persons. 8 3 For example, government is obligated consti-
tutionally to provide either a law library or lawyers (often helped by
paralegals and law students) to prison inmates who wish to evaluate
and assert basic claims.'8 4 The predicate of this disjunctive rem-
edy-law libraries or personal legal help-is the assumption that
these institutionalized litigants are capable of legal self-help. 8 5
When involuntarily committed persons who lack the capacity for
legal self-help-the mentally ill and retarded, children, and disabled
adults-wish to assert basic claims, government ought to be obli-
gated constitutionally to provide them with the personal services of
ing whether it: (1) conflicts with an Act of Congress; (2) conflicts with the rules of proce-
dure promulgated by the Supreme Court; (3) is unconstitutional; or (4) regulates a
matter not within the regulatory power of a local federal court). The inherent power of
a federal court to appoint counsel to represent litigants in civil cases is not inconsistent
with constitutional, statutory, or regulatory law. See supra text accompanying notes 162-
178 and infra text accompanying notes 180-189. Instead, this power is a component of
the court's authority to admit lawyers to practice before it and to regulate their practice.
See Snyder, 472 U.S. at 643; Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) ("Mem-
bership in the bar is a privileged burden with conditions," one of which is that, "like the
court itself," an attorney is "an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice."
(quoting Karlin, 248 N.Y. at 470-71, 162 N.E. at 489)).
180. A court's inherent power derives from its obligation to administer justice fairly.
See supra text accompanying notes 82-85. There are cases in which a court might appoint
counsel pursuant to this flexible standard that do not satisfy the three-part procedural
due process standard which, when applied, determines whether there is a constitutional
right to legal assistance. See infra text accompanying notes 186-191.
181. Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioner's Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to
Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455, 459-60 (1989). See generally
Millemann, supra.
182. See id. at 459-67.
183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
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a trained advocate.18 6
The subsidiary right to legal help should not remain institution-
bound. The primary source of the access to court right is the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. 8 7  The hallmark of due process is flexibility.'8 8
Although the courts are not literally beyond the reach of noninstitu-
tionalized indigent litigants, the complexity of law and law practice
makes the law functionally inaccessible to many. If the litigant's "in-
terest" in the underlying claim in a civil lawsuit is a significant and
protected property or liberty interest, if the government's disinter-
est in providing legal help (a lawyer, paralegal, or trained advocate)
is comparatively insignificant, and if the risk of error from uncoun-
seled representation is substantial, government should be obligated
constitutionally to provide the litigant with appropriate legal
help.'8 9 Trained nonlawyers might provide this required help in
186. See, e.g., Ward v. Kort, 762 F.2d 856, 861 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding unconstitu-
tional Colorado's failure to provide involuntarily confined mental patients with adequate
legal help, including the legal help necessary to file and assert claims in federal habeas
corpus petitions and civil rights cases).
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see Millemann, supra note 181, at 467-76. The addi-
tional sources of the access to court right include the first amendment and the equal
protection clause. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-18, at 759 (2d ed.
1988).
188. See supra note 187.
189. See Millemann, supra note 181, at 467-72. In Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct.
2765 (1989), the Court reversed the holding of two lower courts that prisoners sen-
tenced to death were constitutionally entitled to the assistance of counsel in investigat-
ing, asserting, and litigating capital post-conviction claims. Id. at 2772. Four Justices
expressed their view that death-sentenced prisoners have no constitutional right to
counsel. Id. at 2767 (plurality opinion) (Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined in his opin-
ion by Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia). FourJustices expressed the contrary view.
Id. at 2773 (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,JJ., dissenting). The fifth vote to
reverse was cast by Justice Kennedy, who said:
It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central part of
the review process for prisoners sentenced to death.
The requirement of meaningful access can be satisfied in various ways,
however.... The intricacies and range of options are of sufficient complexity
that state legislatures and prison administrators must be given "wide discre-
tion" to select appropriate solutions. Indeed, judicial imposition of a categori-
cal remedy such as that adopted by the court below might pretermit other
responsible solutions being considered in Congress and state legislatures. As-
sessments of the difficulties presented by collateral litigation in capital cases are
now being conducted by committees of the American Bar Association and the
Judicial Conference, and Congress has stated its intention to give the matter
serious consideration.
Unlike Congress, this Court lacks the capacity to undertake the searching
and comprehensive review called for in this area, for we can decide only the
case before us. While Virginia has not adopted procedures for securing repre-
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many cases;' 9 ° lawyers in others.' 9 ' In the latter cases, courts might
sentation that are as far reaching and effective as those available in other States,
no prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to rep-
resent him in postconviction proceedings, and Virginia's prison system is
staffed with institutional lawyers to assist in preparing petitions for postconvic-
tion relief. I am not prepared to say that this scheme violates the Constitution.
On the facts and record of this case, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Id. at 2773 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Justice Kennedy's opinion reasonably can be interpreted in at least two ways: (I) he
left the decision of the constitutional issue for another day or; (2) he decided that there
is a constitutional right to counsel, but it is not denied when a death-sentenced prisoner
eventually obtains a volunteer lawyer, and has the right to seek help of a paid staff attor-
ney in preparing his post conviction petition.
In two lines of decisions that predated Murray, the Court, however, was faced with,
and resolved, arguments that various provisions of the United States Constitution guar-
anteed civil litigants the right to counsel. One line of decision, grounded in the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment, generally denied the
right to noncapital post-conviction petitioners. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 55 1,
555 (1987) (denying the right to counsel to noncapital post-conviction petitioners); cf.
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617 (1974) (denying a right to counsel to an inmate seek-
ing review of a state criminal conviction by certiorari). In a second line of decisions
grounded in the due process clause, the Court developed either an absolute or qualified
right to counsel in civil proceedings that, like criminal proceedings, can result in the loss
of the litigant's liberty. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31
(1981) (denying absolute right to counsel in proceedings to terminate parental status in
part because such proceedings do not jeopardize personal liberty); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973) (establishing a qualified right to counsel in probation revo-
cation cases); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (providing that "[t]he insti-
tutional parole staff shall render reasonable aid to the parolee in preparation for hearing
and he shall be permitted to advise with his own legal counsel" but failing to reach or
decide the question "whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel
or to appointed counsel if he is indigent" (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.15(1) (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1962))); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (establishing a right to
counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings); cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 48
(1972) ("[w]hen the deprivation of property rights and interests is of sufficient conse-
quence, denying the assistance of counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending
themselves is a denial of due process" (footnote omitted)); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (Powell, J., concurring).
The above cases, which charted the limits of a right to counsel in civil cases, should not
be viewed as rejecting a right to legal help in some civil cases. See supra note 63. The
government's disinterest in providing some noninstitutionalized civil litigants with legal
help from paralegals, trained advocates, or skilled lay persons is not nearly as substantial
as it is in avoiding the costs of providing attorneys to litigants. This reduced govern-
ment disinterest in providing legal help might well change the way the Court would
strike the due process balance in civil cases in which uncounseled litigants faced the
potential loss of important liberty and property interests.
190. The Supreme Court has recognized that some institutionalized litigants have a
right to legal help from nonlawyers in some civil proceedings. For example, in Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), the Court held that illiterate or poorly educated prisoners
who wish to file habeas corpus or civil rights actions have a constitutional right to legal
help from more articulate and experienced prisoner "writ writers." Id. at 485-90. In
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court held that prisoners facing prison
disciplinary proceedings that might result in the loss of good time credits or the imposi-
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exercise their inherent authority to appoint counsel to represent in-
digent litigants.
III. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A MANDATORY PRO BONO RULE
Even if they were accepted, the above arguments-that Article 5
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights has incorporated 11 Hen. 7,
ch. 12 into Maryland law, that courts have inherent authority to ap-
point counsel to represent indigents in civil litigation, and/or that
litigants in some cases constitutionally are entitled to legal help to
enforce their access to court right-would not produce a compre-
hensive mandatory pro bono program. Thus, there is need for a
comprehensive pro bono rule. The debate about it promises to be
as vigorous as anywhere in the nation.
192
tion of solitary confinement were entitled to, inter alia, the personal assistance of coun-
sel-substitute, a lay advocate. Id. at 563-70. And in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980),
Justice Powell casting the 5th vote, construed the plurality's requirement of "qualified
and independent assistance" to an indigent state prisoner who was being threatened
with involuntary transfer to a mental hospital to allow appointment of a trained or quali-
fied lay person, rather than an attorney. Id. at 497-500 (Powell, J., concurring).
Even after Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), which provided prisoners the
disjunctive remedy of law books or lawyers to implement their access to court right, id. at
830-32, lower courts have held that special categories of prisoners are entitled to per-
sonal legal help. See Hadix v. Johnson, 694 F. Supp. 259, 294-95 (E.D. Mich. 1988)
(legal assistance program including attorneys required to remedy, inter alia, deficiencies
in access provided to illiterate or segregated prisoners), aff'd, 871 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir.
1989); United States ex rel. Para-Professional Law Clinic v. Kane, 656 F. Supp. 1099,
1107-08 (E.D. Pa.) (closing inmate-run legal clinic would violate rights of functionally
illiterate prisoners), aff'd mem., 835 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1302
(1988). See generally Millemann, supra note 181, at 466-67 & n.50.
Thus, although government's interest in avoiding a universal appointment of coun-
sel requirement in civil litigation is very substantial, its interest is less in avoiding the
selective appointment of trained lay advocates to civil litigants who are incapable of rep-
resenting themselves and who face the loss of substantial property or liberty interests.
See also D. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 269-73 (1988) (arguing for the deregulation of
the market for routine legal services). Thus, the due process balance might be struck
quite differently in such cases, supporting the development of qualified rights to legal
help from lay advocates in some civil cases.
191. Especially insofar as lawyers refuse both to accept a mandatory pro bono rule
and to relinquish their monopoly power over the practice of law, thus preventing
nonlawyers from representing the poor. See United States v. Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408,
1413 (3d Cir. 1988) ("There is a symbiotic relationship between the court and the attor-
neys who are members of its bar. The court's responsibility for the administration of
justice would be frustrated were it unable to enlist or acquire the services of those who
have, by virtue of their license, a monopoly on the provision of such services.").
192. The mandatory pro bono debate has an extensive bibliography. See, e.g., Elliot,
The Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Invention Not Mothered by Necessity?, 54
CONN. B.J. 265, 284-85 (1980); Maher, No Bono: The Efforts of the Supreme Court of Florida to
Promote the Full Availability of Legal Services, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 973 (1987); Rosenfeld,
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A. Introduction
In 1980, the American Bar Association rejected a proposed
mandatory pro bono rule.' 93 Although the idea then seemed dead,
it has been resurrected, 194 especially in Maryland, 195 by a conver-
Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDozo L. REV. 255
(1981); Shapiro, supra note 75.
193. In 1980, the Kutak Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards of the
American Bar Association, proposed a mandatory pro bono scheme. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (Discussion Draft 1980). Though the commission
originally proposed a rule that would have required every attorney to contribute a fixed
amount of time each year to "unpaid public interest legal service," that rule was re-
jected. Id.; see also Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J.
47 (1980); Kutak, Evaluating the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1016. THE MARYLAND LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
6.1 now provides:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may dis-
charge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a re-
duced fee to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups
or organizations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system
or the legal profession, or by financial support for organizations that provide
legal services to persons of limited means.
Id. (emphasis added).
194. On June 30, 1989, the New York Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal
Services, which had been appointed by the New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge,
submitted a Preliminary Report which "propose[d] that all admitted attorneys actively
practicing law in the State be required to provide a minimum standard of pro bono legal
services in matters affecting the needs of the poor." See letter from Victor Marrero,
Chair, Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, to The Hon. Sol Wach-
tier, Chief Judge, New York State Court of Appeals 2 (June 30, 1989). In the Prelimi-
nary Report, the Committee recommended
that all lawyers admitted to practice in New York and who actually are engaged
in the active practice of law be required to provide a minimum of 40 hours of
qualifying pro bono legal services every two years. Time contributed in any
given period in excess of the minimum standard would be allowed to be carried
forward for four years ....
COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO
THE CHIEFJUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 6 (June 30, 1989) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
REPORT OF NEW YORK]. As defined, "qualifying pro bono legal services" include legal
services in civil matters to indigent clients, legal services in criminal matters to indigent
clients in cases in which there is no governmental obligation to provide representation,
services intended to simplify the legal process for poor persons or increase the availabil-
ity and quality of legal services to poor persons, and services provided to charitable and
public interest organizations on matters that predominantly affect poor persons. Id.
Attorneys practicing as lawyers for government agencies, legal services, and public
interest organizations and private corporations, as well as law schools, are within the
proposal. Id. at 7. "The proposed pro bono service requirement would be an individual
obligation of every attorney covered" with two exceptions. Id. First, attorneys would be
allowed to "aggregate their individual requirements and satisfy their obligation in whole
or in part by group services or activities performed on behalf of the entire group by one
or more of its members." Id. Thus, a law firm could designate one or more pro bono
associates or partners who have practiced law for more than two years. "[O]therwise
unaffiliated lawyers" also could join together for the purpose of discharging their aggre-
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gence of forces. The Reagan Administration sought to "zero-
budget" the national Legal Services Corporation and, through the
Corporation, placed draconian restrictions on expenditures of the
reduced legal services funds that Congress appropriated over the
President's objection.196 This national effort to close local court-
house doors to the poor unintentionally highlighted the unmet need
gate pro bono responsibilities through one or more lawyers. Id. Second, "attorneys
practicing alone or in firms of fewer than 10 lawyers" would be entitled to exercise a
buy-out option. Id. at 8. The Committee's proposal initially fixes the rate at $50 per
hour. Id.
"The Committee propose[d] that administration and enforcement be kept as simple
as possible," with compliance to be achieved through "existing administrative mecha-
nisms and [reliance] on the personal and professional integrity and good faith" of attor-
neys. Id. The Committee recommended additional funding for legal services by
government, expressing its view that the obligation to provide legal services to the poor
is one that is shared by both the legal profession and "society in general." Id. at 9.
In a July 15, 1988, article in the New York Times, David Margolick summarized
mandatory pro bono developments in other jurisdictions:
[T]here are numerous signs that such compulsory programs are inevitable if
not exactly imminent. Courts and bar associations in Texas, Florida, and Ar-
kansas have already put mandatory public service requirements into effect. The
issue has been debated in Oregon and Washington. It is on the table in Mary-
land, and it will soon be addressed in New York by a panel created by Chief
Judge Sol Wachtler and led by Victor Marrero of Brown & Wood and including
the most impressive convert to the cause, former Secretary of State Cyrus R.
Vance.
Margolick, Lawyers and Compulsory Public Service: Resisting the Inevitable, N.Y. Times, July 15,
1988, at B9, col. 1; see also, D. LUBAN, supra note 190, at 277-82 (proposing a model
mandatory pro bono program).
195. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 50. In the aftermath of the Cardin Commission's
recommendation that the Maryland Court of Appeals adopt a mandatory pro bono rule,
the ChiefJudge of the Maryland Court of Appeals sent a letter to 19,323 Maryland law-
yers urging them to fill out a pro bono questionnaire prepared by the Maryland State
Bar Association. The questionnaire is intended to measure and increase the level of
voluntary pro bono work by Maryland attorneys. See Feeley, MSBA Sends Pro Bono Survey
to Md. Lawyers, The Daily Record, Oct. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
196. See Smith & Marr, Poor People Without Lawyers Have No Enforceable Legal Rights: The
Future of Legal Services, 13 LINCOLN L. REV. 39 (1982) (discussing President Reagan's
plans to zero-budget and restructure the Legal Services Corporation (LSC)); Legal Serv-
ices Still the Stepchild, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at A30, col. 1 (editorial criticizing Presi-
dent Reagan's proposed elimination of funds for the LSC); see also D. LUBAN, supra note
190, at 241-43; id. at 241 ("Under the Reagan administration, the LSC has run into hard
times. Its budget for fiscal 1982 and 1983 was cut to $260 million, and its board of
directors has been stacked with individuals hostile to the goals, indeed, to the very exist-
ence, of the LSC; in February of 1987, in fact, LSC Chairman W. Clark Durant III pub-
licly proposed abolishing the corporation. This was in line with the view of the
administration, which each year has proposed defunding the LSC entirely" (footnote
omitted)); cf Barnes, Right Cross, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 1989, at 10, 11 (compar-
ing President Reagan's desire to eliminate financing for the LSC with President Bush's
ambivalent hope that "the issue . .. just] go away").
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for legal help, 19 7 which since then has become even more acute.' 98
By the mid-1980s, participation in many volunteer programs,
including Maryland's, was declining.' 99 Often, the participation
data overstated the services actually provided to the poor.20 0 How-
ever measured, the volunteer efforts have not begun to meet the
need. 20 '
197. Smith & Marr, supra note 196, at 63, attributed part of this unmet need for legal
help directly to the Reagan budget cuts and its stepchild, the Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified in scattered sections of 7
U.S.C. (1982) and 42 U.S.C. (1982)). They affected "programs for the poor in the areas
of welfare, nutrition, housing, community development, and special employment pro-
grams .... Those groups destined to receive the brunt of this curtailment are American
Indians, immigrants, the elderly, and the disabled." Smith & Marr, supra note 196, at 63.
As importantly, even if there were no decrease in the budget of the LSC, "current re-
sources could not meet future client demands." Id.; see also Woods, Challenges Facing
Legal Services in the 1990s: Perspectives of Women and Family Law Advocates, 22 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 457 (1988) (discussing the unmet need for legal services for women).
198. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 50, at ix. The Report noted that less than 20% of
the state's "low-income population is able to receive legal assistance for a wide range of critical civil
legal problems." Id. (emphasis in original). Maryland's unmet legal needs, however, are
not unique. "Similar studies in other states, including Massachusetts and North Dakota,
have revealed that a whopping 85 percent of people embroiled in civil cases were not
getting the help they needed." Bainbridge, Pro Bono Service: What's a Lawyer to Do?, 22
Mo. B.J. 13, 14 (Sept./Oct. 1989).
199. In 1982, the year after the founding of the Maryland Volunteer Lawyer Service
(MVLS), it listed 675 attorneys as members. Memorandum fromJohn Michener, Execu-
tive Director, MVLS, to Richard Gordon (Sept. 20, 1989) (copy on file with Maryland
Law Review). This number peaked at 1709 in 1986 after an intensive recruitment drive.
Id. The interest of many of these attorneys, however, waned, and by 1989 the number of
participating attorneys dropped to 1405. Id. More discouraging though, is that the
number of volunteer attorneys substantially exceeds the number of cases actually
placed, see infra note 200, because a large percentage of the volunteer attorneys refuse to
accept case referrals. This problem has become significantly worse during the past year
or so. Interview with John Michener, Executive Director, MVLS (Feb. 12, 1990).
200. Memorandum from John Michener to Richard Gordon, supra note 199. Below is
a complete list of attorney participation in the MVLS from 1982-1989:
Number
Fiscal of Cases
Year Attorneys Referred
82 675 342
83 931 533
84 825 826
85 1,662 760
86 1,709 823
87 1,600 705
88 1,318 768
89 1,405 540
These data point out that, with the exception of 1984, there is a consistent 2:1 ratio
between the number of attorneys listed as members of the MVLS and the actual number
of pro bono cases.
201. In an article entitled Defeating Mandatory Pro Bono by Making it Unnecessary, John
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These developments occurred during a decade that has earned
its reputation as "the age of greed",2 2 during which the develop-
ment of megafirms,2 °3 increasing salaries, and higher rates for billa-
ble hours have priced many out of the legal services market and
have, in the view of many bar leaders, generated a lack of public
confidence in the bar.
The mandatory pro bono debate has been revived both by in-
creasing concerns about the unmet need for legal help and the pub-
Michener, Executive Director of the MVLS, identified the "trouble with the plea for the
voluntary approach": in Maryland the "approach has been given an extensive try and
has proven utterly inadequate." Md. St. B.A. Bull., Sept. 1988, at 6, col. 1. Michener
persuasively argues that it is the relative success of the MVLS that best demonstrates the
failure of the voluntary pro bono concept.
The Maryland Volunteer Lawyers Service is one of the largest pro bono pro-
grams in the United States, measured either by the size of its attorney panel or
the number of cases handled .... [T]hese criteria of success mask a startling
failure. There are currently about 1,450 attorneys on MVLS's panel [out of
over 13,000 licensed attorneys in Maryland], but in the past year only about
700 of these attorneys have actually taken a new case or continued work on a
case taken earlier. MVLS staff must spend approximately 3 hours contacting
panel attorneys for each case they place. On the average, they encounter 3
refusals before the 4th attorney accepts.
Id. at 6, cols. 3-4.
This description of the MVI.S program, made by its Executive Director, and the
Maryland State Bar Association's self-description of its pro bono efforts share little in
common. In the Report of the Maryland State Bar Association Special Committee on
Pro Bono Services, the Committee justifies the bar's opposition to a mandatory pro
bono rule by announcing that "the membership of the Maryland State Bar Association
has always distinguished itself by its commitment to supporting organized efforts for
meeting the broad range of public interest legal needs throughout Maryland .... RE-
PORT OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR AssOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PRO BONO SERV-
ICES 2. The Committee includes the bar's support for the MVLS as an example of its
"distinguished" record. d.
202. Brill, Big Business Gets Bigger in 87, AM. LAw., July/Aug. 1988, supp. at 6.
203. A 1988 survey showed that the top 100 law firms in the United States produced
revenue in excess of $8.6 billion. Id. Each of these "megafirms" produced income in
excess $45 million. This was a 22% gain from 1987. Id. at 7.
There are two important consequences of this phenomenal growth. First, the
skyrocketing price of legal services, which has accounted for some of the growth, has
pushed legal costs beyond the reach of many middle and lower class people. Lancaster,
The Unrepresented: Litigious U.S. Society Affords Fewer Lawyers To the Poor Nowadays, Wall St.J.,
June 3, 1986, at 1, col. 1. Second, many attorneys believe they do not have the time to
represent the poor due, in part, to greater demand by their firms for increased billable
hours.
The American Lawyers 1988 survey stressed that it is possible to have high Revenue
Per Lawyer (RPL) and at the same time devote a significant part of the firms' resources
to pro bono representation. However, "many firms don't." Brill, supra note 202, supp.
at 20. In fact, when associates were asked about the degree to which their firms en-
couraged pro bono work, the results showed that the firms with the highest RPL rated
the lowest. Conversely, "one of New York's lowest RPL firms ... scored highest in the
pro bono question." Id.
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lic perception of the bar, motivations that often pull the bar in
inconsistent directions.20 4
B. The Objections to Mandatory Pro Bono
The arguments for a mandatory pro bono rule can be organized
as responses to often-heard objections.
1. The "We Are Incompetent To Help "Argument.-Some of the ob-
jections to mandatory pro bono are substantial.20 5 Others trivialize
the profession and underestimate the moral and intellectual capaci-
ties of lawyers; none more so than the "we are incompetent to help"
argument.
"Poverty law" is a series of specialties. In the aggregate, pov-
erty law is complex and comprehensive. This much of the argument
is true. All lawyers, however, need not master all of poverty law, nor
even all of one specialty, to help the poor. Although some compo-
nents of the various poverty law specialties may be idiosyncratic,
many are not. There are poverty law kinfolk within the various fami-
lies of law. For example, there is little of domestic law practice that
is unique to the poor. 2 6 Landlord-tenant law includes common-law
principles and statutory provisions that are familiar to lawyers who
have real estate practices. 20 7 Many commercial lawyers fully under-
204. Public criticism of the profession and the bar's response to it are the continuing
content of a very old conversation. That conversation has more to do with public dis-
trust of the traditional attorney's role, see The Maryland Bar and the Poor, Wash. Post, Jan.
5, 1990, at A2, col. 1 (editorial), than it does with perceived avarice. To the extent the
bar develops a pro bono proposal to respond to public disaffection, it likely will have a
minimalistic content that is dictated by public relations rather than the public good.
Sometimes even the public relations campaign seems deficient. For example, when the
Maryland State Bar Association's Board of Governors rejected the mandatory pro bono
proposal that was generated by the Cardin Commission, it did so at a "closed-door"
meeting to which representatives of the Daily Record, the State's primary legal newspa-
per, were denied access, see Feeley, MSBA Decides on Pro Bono, The Daily Record, Oct. 3,
1988, at 1, col. 3, and itjtkstified its action, in part, by hypothesizing that many members
of the Bar Association would leave the Association if the Association recommended that
they be required to provide legal help to the poor. Although the decision is more com-
plex, the Association appeared to reject the public good for the narrowest reasons of self-
interest.
205. See generally Adler, Fisher, Marable & Rothschild, Pro Bono Legal Services: The Objec-
tives and Alternatives to Mandatory Pro Bono, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 24 (1978).
206. Maryland law that sets forth grounds for divorce, criteria for custody decisions,
and the bases for awarding alimony and child support applies equally to the rich and
poor.
207. Indeed, the Community Law Center, Inc., an organization that matches volun-
teer attorneys with non-profit organizations, works together with the Lawyer's Clearing-
house to recruit and place volunteer attorneys with organizations that wish to develop
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stand how to incorporate and advise a non-profit corporation, and
regularly deal with significant parts of the total body of "consumer
law" that protects the poor. 20 8 Thus, the first response to the "we
are incompetent" argument is that most lawyers can call upon ex-
periences within their areas of competency that equip them to help
the poor in some significant way.
When they are not immediately and fully competent, private at-
torneys are educable. 0 9 If required to do so, they can attain compe-
tence in a discreet area of poverty law that is connected to a private
practice specialty.21 0
When pushed, the sponsors of the "we are incompetent" argu-
ment probably would admit the above points, but predict that some
private lawyers will resist the education needed to attain compe-
tence, refuse to represent indigent clients, or perform
incompetently.
Assuming there is a lawful basis for a mandatory pro bono re-
quirement, widespread civil disobedience is unlikely and the argu-
ments for it are very difficult to identify.2 1 ' If this does occur, the
housing for low-income persons. The volunteer attorneys provide advice and counsel to
the organizations about housing financing transactions.
208. It is customary for an attorney who regularly handles commercial matters to be
familiar with the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1667e (West 1982 & Supp.
1989).
209. The Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers
(MICPEL) has developed a number of "poverty law" offerings for private attorneys. In
1988 alone, MICPEL sponsored programs on lead paint poisoning, AIDS and other con-
tagious diseases in the health care workplace, juvenile law, and special education law. In
addition, MICPEL offered two programs about legal aspects of representing organiza-
tions that provide shelter and personal services to homeless persons. In 1989, MICPEL
offered a series of programs that were designed both to educate practitioners in areas of
"poverty law," and recruit them to do pro bono work. These programs were being
offered at a reduced rate for attorneys who agree to accept a pro bono referral.
210. It is anomalous at the least to suggest that law students are competent to repre-
sent indigents in Maryland's courts, but members of the bar, including many with years
of experience, are not. Both the University of Maryland and University of Baltimore
Schools of Law have well-developed clinical law programs in which law students, work-
ing under faculty supervision, provide legal help to the poor. As a result of the Report
of the Cardin Commission, see supra note 50, the University of Maryland School of Law
has adopted and is implementing a mandatory clinical education program for approxi-
mately two-thirds of the day division students. The other one-third are enrolled in
courses that simulate client experiences but are not "real" client experiences. The law
students who are enrolled in the mandatory clinical component help represent indigent
clients in court. The integrated law school course gives them a minimal level of compe-
tency to do so. Thus, upon graduation, an increasing percentage of the Maryland bar
will have had a clinical education program focused on poverty law.
211. Attorney competence not only benefits clients, it benefits the profession itself.
For example, it "underpins the legal profession's claims to monopoly and to self regula-
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bar has several readily available remedies to deal with it. It can re-
ward pro bono attorneys with public recognition and private expres-
sions of gratitude. It can make participation in continuing
education courses that enhance pro bono competence mandatory,
and sanction refusal to participate. It can enforce minimal compe-
tency requirements of the Maryland Rules of Professional Con-
duct.2 1 2 Or, it can ignore the recalcitrants-at least the disobedients
who refuse to participate-writing off the few attorneys who will
steadfastly resist and happily accepting the many who likely will
respond.
The ultimate flaw in the "we are incompetent" argument is best
revealed by acknowledging, arguendo, some truth in it. Assume that
after four years of college, three years of law school, and varying
periods of law practice, some lawyers are "incompetent" to help the
poor, either in court or outside a courtroom setting. All this de-
spairing assumption tells us is that the poor are far less competent
to represent themselves, and do not have the readily available access
to attaining competency that lawyers have. Competency is a com-
parative concept. Lawyers, even the least proficient lawyers, are
more competent than pro se litigants.2 t3
tion." Garth, Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Compe-
tence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 639, 651.
212. THE MARYLAND LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1989) re-
quires lawyers to "provide competent representation" to all clients, and defines its com-
ponents: "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation." The comment to Rule 1.1 identifies the essential ingredients of
competency that would enable a non-specialized private lawyer to provide competent
assistance to indigent clients:
A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to
handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly
admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience.
Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of
evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the
most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kind of legal
problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particu-
lar specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a
wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also
be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in
the field in question.
THE MARYLAND LAWYERS' RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 comment (1989).
It is apparent that attorney competence is in the interest of lawyers as well as their
clients. "[T]he guarantee of competence is what justifies the professional monopoly.
The adversary system is built on the assumption that each side's position will be repre-
sented effectively by a trained legal advocate." Garth, supra note 211, at 640.
213. One rejoinder is that a minimally competent lawyer can provide a legal matter
with an affirmatively injurious patina of legitimacy. For example, it is contended that
trial judges will not provide the protections to incompetently represented litigants that
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2. The "We Are Too Litigious" Argument.-Our justice system has
not institutionalized alternative dispute resolution (ADR) tech-
niques. It ought to. This proposed normative behavior, however,
ought to be the rule for all litigants, not just the poor.
If we were to develop a piecemeal ADR requirement, the last
place to start would be with a category of indigent litigants. There is
no evidence that the poor have fewer meritorious claims, nor is it
apparent that the claims of the poor are less important than the
claims of nonindigent litigants. It is through litigation that the poor
seek to protect life,214 health,2" 5 and personal safety.21 6 The rights
they assert in litigation often are the rights to food,2 17 housing,2 18 a
minimal education,2 19 and the most rudimentary protection and
care. 220  There is no more important litigation in our litigious
society.
In addition, the effectiveness of ADR techniques, like media-
tion, depends upon a power balance.221 Indigent pro se litigants are
the least skillful and powerful advocates. One step in redressing this
power imbalance would be to provide them with counsel (or other
skilled advocates).222 This might make ADR more effective and fair,
they do to pro se litigants; nor will reviewing courts be as generous to badly represented
litigants as they are to pro se litigants. This response operates on the Alice-In-Wonder-
land assumption that busy judges who sit from 10:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. (with an hour for
lunch) to consider many cases-sometimes as many as one hundred or more-have re-
viewed carefully the scribbled pleadings of pro se litigants, and will patiently divine merit
from often excited and fractious pro se exclamations. Judges, particularly "mass justice"
judges who sit in the nation's lower courts, simply cannot, and probably should not,
perform these basic functions of an advocate.
For thoughtful discussion about the relative and variable concept of lawyer compe-
tence, see Cort & Sammons, The Search for "Good Lawyering"' A Concept and Model of Lawy-
ering Competencies, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 397 (1980); Garth, supra note 211; Trakman,
Competence in the Law: An Unending Search, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 401 (1982).
214. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
215. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
216. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
217. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).
218. See, e.g., Thorpe v. Durham Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
219. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
220. See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307; O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1974).
221. This is so despite its seemingly neutral character. SeeJ. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR,
MEDIATION (1986). Folberg and Taylor note that the mediation "alternative" lacks the
precise checks and balances that are the primary benefit of the adversarial system. "The
purposeful 'alegal' character of mediation creates a constant risk of dominance by the
more knowledgeable, powerful, or less emotional party." Id. at 244.
222. See Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 41 (1982) (lawyers are
necessary to "protect against the dangers of [mediation's] alegal character"); see also J.
FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 221, at 247 ("Independent legal review is a necessity
in divorce settlements, labor contracts, environmental issues, and other legally oriented
1990]
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but it undercuts the mandatory pro bono opponent's purpose in
proposing ADR: to avoid appointing counsel to the poor.
3. The "It Would Not Be As Satisfying" Argument.-Requiring law-
yers to help the poor would deprive them of some of the sense of
self-satisfaction that comes from volunteering to do charitable work.
This is true; as I assume, is the tale of the "beautiful youth in Greek
mythology who pines away for love of his own reflection and is then
turned into the narcissus flower."' 22 3  Pro bono work, whether
mandatory or voluntary, is not a pool in which we can admire our
own reflection. It is not intended primarily to provide lawyers with
emotional perks. It is intended to provide the poor with essential
legal help.224
The narcissist response would have more force if it had an utili-
tarian apologetic; that is, if it were reasonable to predict that a pro
bono requirement would decrease either the actual level of existing
volunteer services or a hypothetical higher level that would result
from enhanced efforts to encourage volunteer help. Neither argu-
ment seems very plausible. Lawyers who now volunteer their time
likely would not be discouraged and would not do less because their
nonparticipating colleagues are told they must help as well. And,
the experience in Maryland does not support a prediction that an
enhanced recruitment effort will produce a hypothetical degree of
encouraged attorney participation greater than that generated by a
requirement that all attorneys provide legal help to the poor.2 2 5
and complex disputes. The reviewing attorneys serve as a check to assure that all neces-
sary items have been considered by the partiqipants and that the proposed agreement
accurately states their understanding.").
223. The definition of "narcissus." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
787 (9th ed. 1986).
224. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. In Maryland, the Maryland State Bar
Association appointed a Special Committee on Pro Bono in response to the mandatory
pro bono recommendation of the Cardin Commission. That Committee initially sup-
ported a "'workable, mandatory pro bono legal services program' " to "'get the most
service for people in need.'" Eveleth, Bar Committee Seeks Workable Mandatory Pro Bono
Plan, Md. St. B.A. Bull., June 1988, at 2, col. 1. Reconsidering, the Committee subse-
quently recommended that the Maryland State Bar Association Board of Governors take
reasonable steps to measure and increase the participation of attorneys in pro bono
programs on a voluntary basis. The Committee intimated that it might support a
mandatory pro bono program if a significant increase in voluntary participation did not
occur. Feeley, Bar Group Backs Away from Required Pro Bono, The Daily Record, Sept. 13,
1988, at 1, col. 3. The Maryland State Bar Association Board of Governors approved
the Committee's recommendation and forwarded it to the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Maryland Court of Appeals. That Committee recom-
mended that the Maryland Court of Appeals send a questionnaire to each attorney in the
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The lawyers who are most likely to be discouraged by a pro
bono requirement are the lawyers who refuse to volunteer, not the
lawyers who now volunteer or are most likely to volunteer as the
result of an enhanced recruitment effort in the future.
4. The "It Must Be Unconstitutional" Argument.-The response of
some lawyers to mandatory pro bono proposals has been a
Pavlovian "it must be unconstitutional" plea. However, the consti-
tutional objections to mandatory pro bono are strained at best. A
pro bono requirement universally imposed upon all members of the
bar, reasonably administered, and with reasonable exemptions,
would deny no lawyer any constitutional right.
a. The First Amendment Challenge to Mandatory Pro Bono.-One
possible constitutional challenge to mandatory pro bono is that it
violates asserted rights of speech, association, and personal auton-
omy protected by the first and fourteenth amendments.2 26 The
Supreme Court has held that the constitution protects one's "right
to associate with others to promote certain causes and ideas. "227
Representing another person is a form of speech or association and
an expression of personal autonomy. Therefore, the argument
goes, if an attorney is forced to represent a client whose beliefs and
value system are contrary to her own, she is denied these important
first and fourteenth amendment rights. The issue is posed most
starkly when a lawyer is required to represent a client whose values,
conduct, or ideas she personally abhors.
The proponents of this argument might invoke arguably analo-
gous first amendment cases, like Wooley v. Maynard, in which the
Court struck down a New Hampshire statute that required noncom-
mercial motor vehicles to have license plates embossed with the
State asking attorneys to indicate how much pro bono work they do and whether they
are interested in doing more. The court has done so. See Feeley, MSBA Sends Pro Bono
Survey to Md. Lawyers, The Daily Record, Oct. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
226. U.S. CONST. amend. I, which reads in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech."
227. Shapiro, supra note 75, at 763; see also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 358 n. 11
(1976) ("[tlhis Court's decisions have prohibited conditions on public benefits, in the
form of jobs or otherwise, which dampen the exercise generally of First Amendment
rights, however slight the inducement to the individual to forsake those rights"); Cous-
ins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975) (finding that a circuit court erred in issuing an
injunction that abridged a political delegation's associational rights); Phillips v. Bureau
of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that right to hold specific employ-
ment and follow a chosen profession is a protectable property interest and must be free
from unreasonable governmental interference).
228. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
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state motto, "Live Free or Die." '229 Maynard, a Jehovah's Witness,
objected to the motto on the ground that it was repugnant to his
moral, political, and religious beliefs.230
In addressing the issue of whether the state can require an indi-
vidual to disseminate an ideological message, 23' the Court stated
that a system that protects one's right to proselytize ideological
causes "must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to fos-
ter such concepts. '232 The statute, the opinion concluded, in effect
required citizens to use their cars as "mobile billboards" for the
State's ideological message.233
The problem with this argument, of course, is that, pursuant to
the traditional concept of a lawyer's role in representing a client, a
lawyer does not (and may not) directly endorse her client's views or
even express her personal opinion about the merits of the client's
claim. The root concept of the lawyer's role is value neutrality. The
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
for example, provide explicitly that "[a] lawyer's representation of a
client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute
an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities.- 23
4
Admittedly, by selecting a client, the lawyer indirectly can en-
dorse a political viewpoint, and during the course of this representa-
tion, she sometimes may be able to endorse directly the client's
views, when to do so advances the client's legal claim. In addition,
the most exciting and happy parts of the practice of law, despite
traditional orthodoxy, 23 5 are not amoral, detached, and value-neu-
tral experiences that consciously sever the values of client from
those of lawyer.
However, even when the marriage of lawyer and client values is
perfect, an appointed lawyer has not chosen, even indirectly, to en-
dorse her client's viewpoints. In this context, the lawyer's argument
229. Id. at 717.
230. Id. at 707.
231. Id. at 713. The Court noted that the express purpose of the license plate, on
private property, was that it be observed and read by the public. Id.
232. Id. at 714.
233. Id. at 715; cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) (requir-
ing dues payments for "agency shop" that engaged in collective bargaining for public
employees was permissible so long as employees' dues were not used to promote ideo-
logical activities or causes not directly connected to the collective bargaining process
that the employee opposed).
234. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983).
235. See, e.g., Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some
Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613.
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that her client's claim has legal merit, even if she truly believes the
legal claim is morally correct, cannot reasonably be viewed as an
endorsement of her client's values. She did not choose to endorse
it. She was appointed to do so.
Thus, the only possible injury to expressive rights is that, by
being appointed to represent one client, a lawyer has one less client
possibility to be personally expressive. That is a de minimis injury,
particularly when weighed against the fundamental law-implement-
ing interest of the client.
A well-designed and properly administered mandatory pro
bono program, however, should (although constitutionally it need
not) avoid this tension by giving lawyers a range of pro bono work
choices that preserves as completely as possible the autonomous
and expressive interests of lawyers.
b. The Takings Challenge To Mandatory Pro Bono.-In Konigsberg v.
State Bar,236 the Court wrote that "the right to practice law has been
held to be a property right within the meaning of the due process
and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution." '237 As with any protectable property right, the ar-
gument goes, the taking of legal services for public use, without
compensation, violates the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution.23 8
Most authorities, however, reject this contention.239 In United
236. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
237. Id. at 253-54.
238. U.S. CONST. amend. V, which reads in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation." See Recent Developments,
Requirement That Attorney Pay Expenses for Defense of Indigent Client Held Unconstitutional With-
out Reimbursement, 6 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 184 (1982-1983). Cases addressing the attor-
ney's constitutional right to compensation for the representation of indigent clients are
collected in Annotation, supra note 174. See also Family Div. Trial Lawyers of the Supe-
rior Court-D.C., Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705-06 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (attorneys not
compensated for pro bono appointments to represent indigent parents in child neglect
proceedings); United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965) (attorney un-
compensated for representation of indigent criminal defendant), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966).
239. See, e.g., Moultrie, 725 F.2d at 705 (compulsory appointment of attorney was not a
taking of property); Dillon, 346 F.2d at 636 (representation did not constitute a taking of
property); cf. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982) (though court
determined that compelled representation does not constitute a violation of the takings
clause, a violation exists when an attorney additionally is required to pay his expenses
without reimbursement). But see State ex. rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 370, 747
P.2d 816, 842 (1987) (attorney's services are property and, therefore, are protected by
takings clause); State v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (court had no
inherent power to appoint attorney without compensation).
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States v. Dillon,24° for example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
faced the question of whether an attorney was entitled, as a matter
of constitutional law, to attorney's fees after appointment to repre-
sent an indigent. 24 ' The court denied compensation based on two
theories: first, that there is no taking under the fifth amendment
when a lawyer is required to fulfill an obligation that the traditions
of the legal profession call on him to accept; 24 2 and, second, the
representation of indigents "is a condition under which lawyers are
licensed to practice as officers of the court. ' 24 ' The problem of pro-
viding some system of compensation for appointed counsel, the
court wrote, "is a matter for legislative and not judicial treat-
ment. '244 Dillon's reasoning is cited with approval in many other
cases denying compensation for pro bono legal services.245
The Supreme Court's recent interpretations of the "takings"
clause of the fifth amendment provide more complete rationales for
the Dillon holding. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glen
Dale v. County of Los Angeles,2 46 the Court imposed a high threshold
on the degree of interference with property that is a "taking;" it
must cause " 'irreparable and permanent injury' " and " 'destroy its
value entirely.' "247 The Court held that there is a temporary taking
240. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
241. Id. at 635.
242. Id. Many of the cases that have rejected fifth amendment takings have focused
on the notion that attorneys have a "duty" to represent indigents concomitant to their
role as "officers of the court." See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 413 P.2d 488 (Alaska 1966);
Scott v. State, 216 Tenn. 375, 392 S.W.2d 681 (1965).
243. Dillon, 346 F.2d at 635. In Dillon, the government also argued that the uncom-
pensated services of an appointed attorney are not within the scope of the fifth amend-
ment's "takings clause" because that clause does not protect personal services. Id. The
court found it unnecessary to consider this argument because it determined that there
was no "taking" in the constitutional sense. Id. at 636; see also Shapiro, supra note 75, at
771 ("[w]hatever protection the due process clause may afford to the interest in practic-
ing law, services are not property within the scope of the just compensation requirement
of the constitution").
244. Dillon, 346 F.2d at 636.
245. See, e.g., Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982); Warner v. Con-
nell, 400 S.W.2d 209 (Ky.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858 (1966); Daines v. Markoff, 92 Nev.
582, 555 P.2d 490 (1976); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966); Exparte
Dibble, 279 S.C. 592, 310 S.E.2d 440 (1983). But see State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688
S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985) (en banc); Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 359 N.Y.S.2d 721
(Sup. Ct. 1974), aff'd mem., 48 A.D.2d 904, 372 N.Y.S.2d 985 (App. Div. 1975). Seegener-
ally Annotation, supra note 174.
246. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
247. Id. at 316-17 (quoting Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 177-78
(1872)); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). At least one
commentator on the takings clause concludes that after the Supreme Court's holdings in
First English and Notian, there is no reliable standard available to determine whether
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if the government denies a landowner "all use of his property. ' '1 4 "
Assuming that the personal services of an attorney constitute
"property, '2 49 it is difficult to imagine that the minimal burden of
even the most ambitious mandatory pro bono program could consti-
tute a "taking." 250 Moreover, a mandatory pro bono rule would be
part of a system of regulating the admission and practice of lawyers
that grants monopoly status to lawyers. Although the attorney's li-
cense to practice law would be conditioned upon a pro bono re-
quirement, the license also would grant the exclusive right to
practice. When a comprehensive regulatory scheme provides a
"reciprocity of advantage, "251 there is no taking because the eco-
nomic harm is linked to economic advantage.252 Certainly, the ben-
efits that lawyers derive from monopoly status far outweigh the
minor obligations that would be imposed by a reasonable
mandatory pro bono rule.
there has been a "taking." Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old Constitu-
tional Tale, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1989). Professor Wilkins notes that, "the Court
has candidly recognized its inability to deduce 'objective rules' that will clearly indicate
when government action 'becomes a taking.' " Id. at 1 (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at
340 (Stevens,J., dissenting)); see also Note, Private Rights v. Public Needs: Nollan v. Califor-
nia Coastal Commission, 1987 DET. C.L. REV. 1201, 1203 (noting lack of precise
standards).
248. First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
249. See supra note 239. In some circumstances, services may constitute "property."
See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916); Green, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases:
The Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366 (1981).
250. The total annual hour commitment required by most of the mandatory pro bono
proposals is less than one work week. See supra note 194. And, in Maryland, at least
when an attorney who volunteers for time through the MVLS program spends more
than 20 hours on a case, she is entitled to $30 per hour reimbursement for the addi-
tional hours. See letter from RobertJ. Rhudy, Executive Director of the Maryland Legal
Services Corporation, to Ann Bartsch, Oregon Law Foundation (May 4, 1988) (copy on
file with Maryland Law Review). The donation of such a minimal period of uncompen-
sated time would fall short of a "taking." See, e.g., Family Div. Trial Lawyers of the Supe-
rior Court-D.C., Inc. v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695, 705 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (if the practice of
assigning uncompensated counsel to cases "effectively denies ... [attorneys] the oppor-
tunity to maintain a remunerative practice .... " it might constitute a "taking"); accord
State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816 (1987); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487
S.W.2d 294, 298 (Ky. 1972); In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d
87 (1975); State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 159 W. Va. 805, 227 S.E.2d 314 (1976).
251. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (opinion of Justice
Holmes).
252. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (zoning laws do not result in an unconstitutional "taking" because
"on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of zoning will be benefited by
another").
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c. The Thirteenth Amendment Challenge To Mandatory Pro Bono.-
Critics of mandatory pro bono have sometimes argued that the re-
quirement amounts to "involuntary servitude," in violation of the
thirteenth amendment. This argument has "generally, though not
universally, been rejected by the courts. 2 53
It is surprising-surprising is a polite word-to hear some of
the most wealthy, unregulated, and successful entrepreneurs in the
modern economic world invoke the amendment that abolished slav-
ery to justify their refusal to provide a little legal help to those, who
in today's society, are most like the freed slaves.
A condition of "servitude" exists only when an individual is
subjected to physical restraint or the threat of legal confinement as
an alternative to coerced service. Thus, the thirteenth amendment
does not prohibit even coerced work if the worker has a choice be-
tween continued service or freedom, even if the "master" has led
the individual to believe that his choice may entail exceedingly
harmful consequences. In short, the inability to avoid continued
service is the essential ingredient of involuntary servitude. "In the
case of lawyers, then, the imposition of professional discipline, even
to the point of disbarment, for refusal to accept an assignment, ap-
pears to pass muster under the thirteenth amendment. '254
253. See, e.g., Moultrie, 725 F.2d at 705 ("the essential ingredient" of involuntary servi-
tude is the "inability to avoid continued service;" a lawyer always may cease to practice
law); Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982); State ex rel. Stephan v.
Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 747 P.2d 816 (1987); People v. Hutchinson, 38 Mich. App. 138,
195 N.W.2d 787 (1972); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985); State v.
Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966). However, in Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22
Utah 2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968), the court invalidated a statute providing for the un-
compensated appointment of counsel to represent an alleged insane person in a pro-
ceeding for involuntary hospitalization. The court found that "[u]ntil the legislature
provides a method by which a lawyer can be paid for compulsory services to an indigent
person," the statute will subject appointed counsel to involuntary servitude. Id. at 15,
447 P.2d at 195. In Brooks v. Central Bank of Birmingham, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.(BNA) 182 (N.D. Ala. 1982), vacated, 717 F.2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1983), the court held that§ 706()(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which authorizes federal district courts to
appoint counsel to represent Title VII litigants, violates the constitutional prohibition
on involuntary servitude. The court rejected the appellants' contention that the thir-
teenth amendment should be limited to chattel slavery. Id. at 184. The court reasoned
that "[i]f the meaning of involuntary servitude were limited to the narrow categories
appellants say it is, what would be the point in excluding from the operation of those
words the forced labor of a convicted criminal?" Id. In the court's view, the thirteenth
amendment must have a "broader and far more humane meaning than appellants' argu-
ment ascribes to it." Id. The court concluded that " 'to decree that a man shall perform
his contract of service, or be imprisoned for contempt of court should he refuse, is to
subject him to involuntary servitude.' " Id. at 186 (quoting Stevens, Involuntary Servitude
by Injunction, 6 CORNELL L.Q 235, 245 (1921)).
254. Smith, 242 Kan. at 378, 747 P.2d at 847 (citation omitted).
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d. The Equal Protection Challenge to Mandatory Pro Bono.-There
is a rational basis for a mandatory pro bono requirement. There
need be no greater justification. A mandatory pro bono require-
ment would neither abridge a fundamental right, 25 5 nor be "sus-
pect"; the legal profession hardly qualifies as a class whose members
have been targets of historic discrimination or are politically
powerless.256
Classifications in mandatory pro bono rules commonly are as-
sailed on at least two grounds. First, opponents question why law-
yers should be subject to special requirements when other
professions-for example, doctors and plumbers-are not. A sim-
ple answer might be that there is a Medicaid system that, however
imperfect, gives indigents minimal access to medical care. Plumbers
do not have a monopoly that precludes others-friends, family, or
inexpensive helpers-from fixing leaky pipes. A more complete an-
swer is that the access to law that an appointed lawyer would pro-
vide has singular importance in a democratic society. At a
minimum, it is not irrational for a government to so conclude. 57
Second, opponents of a mandatory pro bono program argue
that inevitably its burdens will fall disproportionately upon some
subclasses of lawyers. This inequality, however, is not inevitable.
All lawyers, litigators and nonlitigators, are capable of providing
some help to the poor. A thoughtful mandatory pro bono program
ought to include a menu of contributed services that allows, and
conversely requires, every lawyer to participate. So conceived and
administered, a mandatory pro bono program would not run afoul
of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection.258
255. See supra text accompanying notes 226-254.
256. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 238 & n.2 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring)
(explaining the Supreme Court's treatment of certain classifications as "suspect").
257. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (holding that the four-
teenth amendment "does not empower th[e] Court to second-guess state officials
charged with ... allocating limited public welfare among the myriad of potential recipi-
ents"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (holding that the fourteenth
amendment "permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect
some groups of citizens differently than others"); see also Williamson v. Vardeman, 674
F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Meizlish, 387 Mich. 228, 196 N.W.2d 129 (1972); People
v. Hutchinson, 38 Mich. App. 138, 195 N.W.2d 787 (1972); Daines v. Markoff, 92 Nev.
582, 555 P.2d 490 (1976). But see Smith, 242 Kan. at 361, 747 P.2d at 836 (invalidating a
mandatory pro bono requirement that imposed a significantly disproportionate burden
on a small percentage of lawyers).
258. Maryland's Attorney General, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., has developed a voluntary
pro bono program in the Office of the Attorney General. That program includes liti-
gators and nonlitigators who are paid to work full-time for the state. It harnesses the
pro bono energies of lawyers who represent state agencies that touch the lives of the
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5. "The Government, not the Private Bar, has the Responsibility to
Provide Legal Services to the Poor" Argument.-This argument is half
right and, to that extent, is seductive. It should be the duty of gov-
ernment-the people collectively-to provide legal services to the
poor. In significant part, government exists to make 259 and en-
force26 ° laws. This basic duty derives from, and is as old as, the
Social Compact. Laws usually are not self-enforcing; lawyers play a
significant role in enforcing them. Government should accept and
discharge the primary duty to provide lawyers to the poor so that
the laws that it enacts to protect the poor are enforced. The civil law
enforcement obligation inheres' in the law-giving function.26'
However, the second part of the argument-that private attor-
neys have no obligation to provide pro bono legal help to the poor-
does not logically follow from the valid premise that the duty to pro-
vide such help belongs primarily to the government. Historically,
lawyers shared this duty with government. Indeed, they often acted
as the informal partners of government when they represented the
poor; in so doing, they helped government fulfill, not deny, its
responsibility.2 6 2
This government-private partnership is as important today as it
was in fifteenth century England. Government is not providing ade-
quate legal help to the poor. The private bar's resistance to
poor every day and, thus, are most likely to have conflicts of interests with indigent
clients. Because it is the most difficult law office in which to institute a pro bono pro-
gram, the Attorney General's program demonstrates that the pro bono burden can be
apportioned fairly throughout the bar. The participating assistant attorneys general
take all necessary steps to separate their pro bono representation from office work. As-
sistants do their pro bono work on their own time. Cases are referred to the Office's Pro
Bono Coordinating Committee from the MVLS, the Community Law Center, Inc., and
the House of Ruth. These organizations interview prospective clients to make sure they
are financially eligible. The Committee, which consists of a Deputy Attorney General
and seven assistants, screens the referred cases for any potential conflicts of interest. If
there appears to be no conflict in a case, it is then sent to one of the volunteer lawyers.
If a conflict arises, it is sent back to the referring organization.
The office sponsors training programs, gives seminars, and provides training mater-
ials to volunteer attorneys. All expenses for the program are paid by the Public Lawyers
Legal Services Program, Inc., a non-profit corporation.
To minimize any potential conflict between an assistant's responsibility to her offi-
cial duties and her pro bono work, the volunteer is not asked to handle more than one
case at a time. As of August 1989, approximately 125 of the 300 assistants at the Mary-
land Office of the Attorney General had volunteered to take cases.
259. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
260. See U.S. CONST. arts. Il-IIl.
261. Indeed, it can be argued plausibly that government not only should provide legal
help to the poor in civil cases, but that it must do so, at least in a significant number of
civil cases. See supra text accompanying notes 180-191.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 116-136.
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mandatory pro bono has not revealed a void that an embarrassed.
government has rushed to fill. If there is to be a significant increase
in the amount of legal help that is provided to the poor, it will be
because: (1) the private bar adds its resources to government's; and
(2) in so doing, convinces government that it should do more. This
partnership agreement should be negotiated with government as an
explicit predicate to a mandatory pro bono program. Mandatory
pro bono makes little sense as a substitute for government-spon-
sored legal services programs. It is justifiable if it adds resources to
the indigent legal services delivery system. Its real potential, how-
ever, lies in using significant private resources to encourage govern-
ment to provide significantly more help.263 To be an effective
leader, the private bar must match its rhetoric with action, demand-
ing reciprocal action from government.264
There is a moral tone to the argument that the private bar-and
government are partners (at least metaphorical partners), and both
have responsibilities to the poor.26 5 But, like any partnership agree-
ment, the reciprocal obligations in the "agreement" between the
bar and government are grounded in self-interest.
266
For its part, the bar obtains not only the right to regulate itself,
which follows from government's recognition of the practice of law
as a profession,2 67 but also government-sanctioned monopoly sta-
263. The Cardin Commission understood this. It successfully encouraged Maryland's
Governor, William Donald Schaefer, to increase state funding for state legal services
programs by indicating how the private bar also would do more to help the poor. See
ACTION PLAN, supra note 50, at 34.
264. The Preamble and Preliminary Statement of the American Bar Association's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility recognizes the primary role attorneys play in
enforcing government's law. It states that "justice is based upon the rule of law" and
that lawyers are "guardians of the law," thus "play[ing] a vital role in the preservation of
society." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble and Preliminary
Statement (1981).
265. For the moral argument, see D. LUBAN, supra note 190, at 248-49.
266. In thirty-seven jurisdictions, it is a misdemeanor for a nonlawyer to prac-
tice law ("practicing law" is construed to include a large number of activities
that on the surface do not require legal training, such as assisting people in
filling out do-it-yourself divorce forms); seven other jurisdictions have formal-
ized the power of courts to cite unauthorized practitioners for contempt. By
restricting the practice of law to members of the bar, of course, a professional
monopoly is guaranteed and a higher-than-otherwise level of lawyers' fees is
maintained.
Id. at 246-47.
267. "The very idea of a profession connotes the function of service, the notion that
to some degree the professional is to subordidate his interests to the interests to those in
need of his services." See Pepper, supra note 235, at 615. Among the seven characteris-
tics of a profession suggested by Pepper are that the "profession holds a monopoly on a
service frequently needed by individuals, and as a result wields significant economic
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tus. That sanction immunizes the bar's monopoly status from anti-
trust laws, 2 6 8 and grants a significant anticompetitive economic
advantage to lawyers. One consequence of this monopoly status is
that poor people cannot call upon law students, paralegals, or more
intelligent and articulate friends to help them draft pleadings or
make arguments in court.2 6 9
In return for recognizing the practice of law as a profession and
granting it monopoly status and the power to regulate itself, govern-
ment obtains the civilian police force that is necessary to discharge
its civil law enforcement duty. It is "private" lawyers who enforce
government's civil laws in government's institutions before govern-
ment's agents. As their contribution to the partnership, lawyers ex-
ercise government's delegated sovereignty. Because the law
enforcement delegation is made by a constitutional democracy that
includes the promise of equal justice within its positive law, the dele-
gation to the bar includes not only the power and responsibility to
enforce laws, but also the duty to enforce them equally.270 Thus, it
inevitably includes a mandatory pro bono requirement.27'
In recommending a pro bono requirement of forty hours every
two years, the New York Committee to Improve the Availability of
power" and that it "is largely self-regulated in determining and administering the quali-
fications for membership and in policing professional activities." Id.
268. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363 (1977) (holding that the action of a state
Supreme Court acting "legislatively" in regulating a state bar is exempt from the anti-
trust laws); see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
269. In Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Competence
and the Consumer Perspective, supra note 21, Garth describes the historic self-interest that
gave rise to the rigid and over-inclusive unauthorized practice of law rules:
In 1938, participating in a symposium condemning "the unauthorized
practice of law," Carl Llewellyn asked a somewhat embarrassing question:
"Who is worrying about unauthorized practice, and why? Is it the public, com-
plaining of quacks? Is it the profession concerned about the public welfare?
Or who and why?" As Llewellyn and other commentators have recognized, the
lack of paying work in the depression to a large extent explained the bar's sen-
sitivity to the problem of unauthorized practice, or competition by nonlawyers.
Neither public demand nor concern about public welfare adequately justified
the sudden emphasis on eliminating the unauthorized practice of law. It was
primarily the profession's issue-not that of the general public.
Garth, supra note 211, at 650 (footnotes omitted).
270. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
271. See D. LUBAN, supra note 190, at 2A5-87; see also H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 59
(1953) ("In recognition of these exclusive privileges, the lawyer is charged with certain
obligations to the public [including the duty] to represent without charge those unable
to pay.").
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Legal Services implicitly recognized the significance of this basic
bargain between government and the bar. It said:
This [mandatory pro bono] duty flows from the lawyer's
role as a professional and an officer of the court and arises
particularly from the lawyer's possession of unique training
and skills and of the exclusive, publicly granted franchise to
practice law. Indeed, no other group is qualified or law-
fully entitled to fill the need for legal services.2 72
Recognition of a pro bono duty in the delegation of law en-
forcement sovereignty that is the quid pro quo for private advantage
is not a new idea. King James understood it when he deputized the
Scottish advocate as an "advocatus pauperum." The patrician sena-
tors of Rome-the patroni-understood it when they represented
their allegiants in court. So did the Church's ecclesiastical lawyers,
the English Serjeants, and the private lawyers who were appointed
without fee to represent the poor in England pursuant to 11 Hen. 7,
ch. 12. Many lawyers today understand and accept this duty, born in
reciprocity. We all should.273
272. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF NEW YORK, supra note 194, at 21.
273. In many European countries, the historic pro bono duty is embodied in contem-
porary legal aid programs. In Italy, "legal aid (patrocinio gratuito) is declared 'un officio
onorifico ed obbligatorio' of the legal profession, meaning that lawyers must act for the
poor if called upon to do so but receive no fees unless the client prevails and costs are
recovered from his opponent." Cappelletti & Gordley, supra note 94, at 364. In France,
as in Italy, "lawyers are assigned to the cases of indigents who qualify for aid and are
neither compensated for their services nor allowed, under normal conditions, to refuse
an assignment." Id. at 368. In Germany, private attorneys who handle legal aid cases
are compensated at a level "well below that normal litigation." Id. at 371. Appointment
of an attorney "rests within the discretion of the judge." Id. at 372. As the result of the
Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, indigents in England may choose their lawyers "from
a panel of practitioners who have announced their willingness to accept such cases." Id.
at 374. The participating attorneys are paid substantial fees, although below market
rate. Id. "Aid is available in courts of limited jurisdiction on the same basis as in other
courts, but it is generally not available in proceedings before special tribunals." Id. In
addition, "legal advice is available under the program from solicitors chosen freely by
the applicant." Id.
To a greater or lesser extent, the European legal aid programs rely heavily upon the
volunteer efforts of private attorneys. There is much that is wrong with such substantial
reliance upon the private bar to deliver a service that the government should be obli-
gated to provide in significant part. See, e.g., id. at 364-76. There is just as much wrong
with relying almost exclusively on the beneficence of government (that often are defend-
ants in legal aid lawsuits) to provide legal help to the poor. In view of our national
resources,
the funds spent on the legal services program [in this country] can only be
regarded as trivial. As a result, case loads have become vastly disproportionate
to those of the private practitioner and have raised concern over the quality of
services provided. Many communities have no office at all, and even where
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
Let us return to Baltimore City's Rent Court. It is five years
after the adoption of the mandatory pro bono rule in Maryland.
There still is a "white slip" line, but there now is a lawyer who coun-
sels each person in that line about possible defenses to eviction that
person might have and the impact that accepting a put-out order
might have on the future assertion of rights.2 7 4
Before court convenes, the trial judge advises the pro se land-
lords and tenants in the crowded courtroom that, as an alternative
to trial that day, the pro se parties can talk to a settlement officer who
will attempt to assist the parties in reaching a mutually acceptable
settlement of their dispute.2 7 5
Yet another attorney, who is supervising a paralegal, law stu-
dent, and trained lay advocate, interviews eligible clients (tenants
and landlords) who wish to either present their case to the settle-
ment officer or try it in court. The interviewer advises each of the
interested clients whether they have meritorious claims and de-
fenses. If they do, the attorney either advises them about the settle-
ment process or represents them in court for the purpose of
obtaining a postponement to investigate more fully, and present,
their claims or defenses. The attorney, or one of her trained parale-
gals, law students, or lay advocates (working under her supervision),
will represent the client in court when the case eventually is heard.
The above attorneys and advocates are a mixture of private and
public attorneys.
The private attorneys, whether they be advisors, supervisors,
settlement officers or litigators, perform their obligations as part of
the mandatory pro bono program. Their time requirement is fifty
hours per year; the time they spend attaining competency by partici-
pating in a continuing legal education program (or other training
program) is counted towards the time requirement. The Maryland
Institute for The Continuing Professional Education of Lawyers
(MICPEL) sponsors the training on a pro bono basis, and the law-
yers who teach in the MICPEL program count those hours toward
their pro bono requirements. When any of the participants in the
offices are available lawyers have been forced to turn away numbers of potential
clients simply because of a shortage of time.
Id. at 379. Thus, the need for a mandatory pro bono rule remains great.
274. See supra note 49.
275. See Tidus, Barristers' Pro Bono Projects/A Little of Your Time Goes a Long Way, L.A.
LAWYER, Sept. 1986, at 60-61 (describing a Landlord-Tenant Settlement Officer Pro-
gram in Los Angeles that is staffed by volunteer attorneys).
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mandatory pro bono program exceeds his/her fifty hours per year,
for example, to conclude a case, the excess hours are either credited
towards the future pro bono requirement or reimbursed at the rate
of thirty dollars per hour. 276
The participating public attorneys are newly funded by the state
as the result of a negotiated grant that is intended to "match" the
extensive private contributions of legal resourses. The Maryland
Volunteer Lawyers Service, with an additional grant from the Mary-
land Legal Services Corporation, administers the mandatory pro
bono program. It refers indigent clients to participating attorneys,
accepts the self-reports filed by the participating attorneys that indi-
cate how much time they have spent on a case or matter, and certi-
fies that attorneys have satisfied their pro bono requirements.
Participating attorneys are given a wide range of choices that
include providing advice and counsel to indigent clients (individu-
ally or through groups), teaching interested indigent clients how to
represent themselves, interviewing clients, preparing cases for trials
or settlement proceedings, or representing the clients before the
court or settlement officer.
The Scottish advocatus pauperum, who represented the feudal
tenants of the Abbey of Arbroath, would be proud!
276. As a result of negotiations with the state, the state has expanded its Judicare
program to bear these costs, as well as litigation expenses of the indigent clients and the
cost of malpractice insurance for participating attorneys whose malpractice policies do
not cover them.
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